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UNITED STATES v. CttEELY: LEAVING THE BACK DOOR OPEN FOR
ARBITRARY DEATH SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCTION
What I want people to know is, that they call me a cold-blooded
killer. I shot a man who shot me first. The only thing that con-
victed me is that I'm a Mexican and he was a police officer. From
there you call me a cold-blooded murderer. I didn't tie anybody
to a stretcher. I didn't pump poison into anybody's veins from
behind a locked door. You call this justice. I call this and your
society a bunch of cold-blooded murderers.-Henry M. Porter,
executed by lethal injection on July 9, 1985, in Texas.I
Few issues have created greater controversy for our nation's criminal
justice system than capital punishment.2 At the center of this storm is the
1. Tom Kuntz, Word for Word: The Condemned; As Executions Mount, So Do Infa-
mous Last Words, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, § 4, at 7. As his cutting final statement
makes clear, Mr. Porter believed he had received the death penalty because of
nothing more than blind chance. His statement echoes concerns voiced by the
United States Supreme Court, which has been especially concerned with eradicat-
ing randomness in death sentencing. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10
(1976) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.");
id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("IT] he punishment of death ... smacks of
little more than a lottery system."). For a more detailed discussion of the Court's
concern with inconsistent sentencing, see infra notes 6, 44, 47-53, 64-68 and ac-
companying text.
2. BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PEN-
ALTy 1 (1987); see alsoJAN GoREc~i, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SO-
CIAL EVOLUTION ix (1983) ("Capital punishment is today among the most
controversial problems in America."); Sandra R. Acosta, Recent Developments, Impos-
ing the Death Penalty Upon Drug Kingpins, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 596, 597 (1990)
("Capital punishment has been practiced in the United States since its founding,
and always has excited passionate debate."); Shelly Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral
Response: Rethinking Texas' Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX.
L. REv. 407, 423 (1990) ("[NJearly twenty years after Furman, the debate still rages
about discretion in capital sentencing."); Michael D. Hintze, Note, Attacking the
Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy Twenty Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 395, 395 (1993) ("The death penalty is perhaps the most controversial
and widely discussed aspect of our criminal justice system.").
This controversy causes "severe and sometimes bitter conflicts between and
among both state and federal courts." Hintze, supra, at 419. Disagreement be-
tween the Supreme CourtJustices themselves best testifies to the depth of the con-
troversy. Dissenting opinions in death penalty cases are typically scathing. Id. at
420 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking.")); see
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 444-57 (1980) (plurality opinion) (White, J.,
dissenting) (describing murder in unusually graphic manner, and characterizing
majority's decision as "shredded by its own illogic"); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506
(1461)
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the
infliction of "cruel and unusual" punishment.3 Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court has interpreted this terse phrase to require different meas-
ures from legislatures and sentencers at different times.
4
Further adding to the controversy, the Supreme Court identified two
Eighth Amendment requirements for avoiding arbitrary death sentencing,
based on opposing rationales.5 The first requirement, consistency, fo-
U.S. 390, 446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The execution of a person who
can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder.").
The large number of important death penalty cases which have been decided
by pluralities further evidences judicial disagreement concerning capital punish-
ment. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (same); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (same); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (same). In addition, even
when the Justices form a majority, it is often a very slim one. See, e.g., Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (5-4 decision); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989) (5-4 decision); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (5-4 decision);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (5-4 decision).
Outside the United States, 103 countries use the death penalty. David Mazie,
Death Penalty Remains Alive Around World, Arousing Strong Passions, LA. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1994, at 2A1. Nevertheless, the United States is the only North Atlantic Treaty
Organization nation other than Turkey that routinely executes criminals. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The amendment simply states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." Id. For a further discussion of the amendment, see infra note 32
and accompanying text.
4. See Project, Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEO. L.J. 1151, 1153-54 n.2848
(1989) [hereinafter PROJECT]. "[P]unishments once considered permissible have
later been held to violate the Eighth Amendment." Id. (comparing In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("stating that death penalty not cruel and unusual unless
manner of execution is inhumane and barbarous") with Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188
("noting that death penalty cruel and unusual if sentencing procedures create sub-
stantial risk of arbitrariness")); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172-73 ("[Tlhe Eighth
Amendment has not been regarded as a static concept.").
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment varies because courts first examine
society's "evolving standards of decency" to determine whether a particular prac-
tice violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition. See id. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962);
see also Hintze, supra note 2, at 408 n.75. While courts presume that a democrati-
cally chosen punishment represents societal standards, the punishment still needs
to be weighed against the Eighth Amendment's core requirements. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173-76. For a further discussion of varying interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment and reliance upon societal values, see infra notes 37-39 and accompa-
nying text.
5. First, the Court identified the need for consistency in death sentencing. See
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 220-21 (White, J., concurring) ("In Furman, this Court held that
as a result of giving the sentencer unguided discretion to impose or not to impose
the death penalty for murder, the penalty was being imposed discriminatorily,
wantonly and freakishly .. "); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that Eighth Amendment prohibits "se-
lective or irregular application of harsh penalties"); id. at 294 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring) (arguing that statutory system must provide "rational basis that could
differentiate... the few who die from the many who go to prison"). For a further
1462 (Vol. 40: p. 1461
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cused on limiting sentencer discretion. 6 The second requirement, indi-
vidualization, focused on permitting sentencer discretion. 7 Consequently,
discussion of the consistency requirement, see infra notes 44, 47-53, 64-68 and ac-
companying text.
Second, the Court identified the need for individualized consideration in
death sentencing. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 ("[WIe conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death."); Woodson 428 U.S. at 304 ("[W]e believe that...
the Eighth Amendment... requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a consti-
tutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.")
(citation omitted). For a further discussion of the individualization requirement,
see infra notes 48, 55-59, 75-77 and accompanying text.
As a result of its identification of two separate Eighth Amendment require-
ments, Supreme Court precedent embodies two distinct lines of cases, one based
on consistency and one based on individualization. See Ronald J. Mann, The Indi-
vidualized-Consideration Principle and the Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 29 Hous. L. REv. 493, 495 (1992). Mann writes that "Furman and Gregg are
thought to stand for a 'consistency-based' principle, the general goal of which is to
ensure that similarly situated defendants receive similar sentences." Id. He further
concludes that "Woodson v. North Carolina... and Lockett are thought to stand for a
contrary principle requiring that specified procedures be followed before inflic-
tion of the death penalty." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 499 ("[Tilhe stat-
utes at issue in Woodson and Lockett were invalidated because they precluded
individualized consideration."). Other commentators agree. See, e.g., Scott E.
Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation
in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rv. 1147, 1148 (1991) ("The[ ] principles of
guided discretion and individualized consideration comprise almost the entire
foundation upon which the Court has built its framework of constitutional rules
regulating the death penalty.").
6. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 ("Furman mandates that where discretion is af-
forded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.").
Justice Douglas expressed a special concern in Furman about the need to limit
sentencer discretion. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 248, 255 (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[Sentencers] have practically untrammelled discretion to let an accused live or
insist that he die.... Yet we know that the discretion ofjudges and juries in impos-
ing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied .... "). Sen-
tencer discretion is dangerous if it "opens the door to a degree of arbitrariness in
all the borderline cases where the just measure of punishment is unclear." See
GoPucgi, supra note 2, at 22 (concluding that sentencer discretion inevitably
"opens the door" to arbitrariness).
7. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (holding that sentencer must be allowed
to consider "the character and record of the individual offender and the circum-
stances of the particular offense"). Since Woodson, a majority of the Court contin-
ues to express the need for individualized sentencing procedures. See, e.g., Lockett,
438 U.S. at 608 ("To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute
must not preclude [the sentencer's] consideration of relevant mitigating fac-
tors."). Throughout his term on the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun continued
to express his support for more individualized consideration in sentencing. See id.
at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing with plurality that Ohio statute did
not "permit[ ] anyconsideration by the sentencing authority of the extent of [the
defendant's] involvement, or the degree of [the defendant's] mens rea, in the
19951 NOTE 1463
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the two requirements were potentially contradictory.8
Unfortunately, the Court did not guide legislatures on how to design
a statute that, taken as a whole, would satisfy the Eighth Amendment's
divergent directives.9 Instead, the Court divided application of the re-
commission of the homicide"). For a discussion of Justice Blackmun's concern
with this issue, see infra notes 82-83, 178, 197 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of how the two Eighth Amendment requirements conflict, see infra notes 8,
60-63, 78-83, 177-83, 192-97 and accompanying text.
8. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
cannot possibly be guided by what seem to me incompatible principles .... ). For
a further discussion of the contradictory nature of the two requirements, see infra
notes 60-63, 78-83, 177-83, 192-97 and accompanying text.
9. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (separating requirements into
two different sentencing stages); see also Staley v. Texas, 887 S.W.2d 885, 902 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994) (Baird, J., concurring) (stating that Supreme Court's failure to
explain how Furman-mandating consistency requirement-and Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989) -espousing individualization requirement-operating to-
gether leave lower courts with no choice but to adhere to most recent opinion
"and await further guidance"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1366 (1995). At least one
commentator agrees. See Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentenc-
ing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323, 328 (1992) ("Yet,
the Court has provided no way to resolve [Woodson and Lockett] claims in harmony
with Gregg."). Howe concluded that the Court has been unsuccessful in its at-
tempts to accommodate the two approaches. Id. at 379. For a further discussion
of Zant's separate sentencing stages, see infra notes 64-68, 84-87 and accompany-
ing text. For a further discussion of Penry's individualization requirement, see infra
notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
The Court in Furman, however, addressed inconsistency resulting from death
sentencing as a whole, presumably including both stages discussed in Zant. See
Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that concern was for
"discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty") (emphasis added);
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVrrABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 56 (1974) ("[T]he 1972 Furman case ... can be read... as a condemna-
tion of standardless discretion in sentencing-a discretion often lodged in the jury
or judge."). For a further discussion of the consistency requirement, see infra
notes 44, 47-53, 64-68 and accompanying text.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Woodson also addressed the lack of individ-
ualized consideration in death sentencing as a whole. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304
("[W]e believe that ... the Eighth Amendment... requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the pen-
alty of death.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). For a further discussion of the
individualization requirement, see infra notes 48, 55-59, 75-77 and accompanying
text.
Further, the different stages of sentencing detailed in Zant do not inherently
lend themselves to application of one requirement or the other. Justice Blackmun
stated: "It is the decision to sentence a defendant to death-not merely the deci-
sion to make a defendant eligible for death-that may not be arbitrary." Callins v.
Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The sec-
ond stage outlined in Zant creates an even greater risk of inconsistency, because at
this stage the sentencer ultimately determines who will die and who will live. See
Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79 (stating that second stage is where persons from eligible
class are selected for death penalty). Along these lines, Justice Thomas noted that
during actual sentencing, the second stage of Zant, "providing all relevant informa-
tion for the sentencer's consideration does nothing to avoid the central danger
1464 [Vol. 40: p. 1461
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quirements and established a two-tired sentencing procedure. 10 Only the
threshold sentencing determination of who is eligible to receive a death
sentence must comply with the consistency requirement."1 In the same
way, only the selection of a defendant to actually receive a death sentence
must meet the individualization requirement.1 2 Moreover, after separat-
ing them, the Court further developed its interpretation of the require-
ments, to the point that they cannot be logically applied side-by-side.' 3
As a result, Court-approved death sentencing procedures fail to real-
ize the Eighth Amendment's bar against arbitrariness.' 4 According to the
Court's modern interpretation of the consistency requirement, a statutory
system must limit sentencer discretion to select who is eligible for a death
sentence.1 5 By complying with this requirement, however, a system turns a
that sentencing discretion may be exercised irrationally." Graham v. Collins, 113
S. Ct. 892, 910 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Moreover, in determining who is eligible for the death sentence, the focus of
the first stage, the defendant's culpability-traditionally considered as a mitigating
factor offered to fulfill the individualization requirement-could be very impor-
tant. See Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1133-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, this is
the very argument that the Ninth Circuit asserted in Cheely. United States v.
Cheely, 36 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1994). For a further discussion of the role culpabil-
ity considerations played in the Cheely court's analysis, see infra notes 113-17 and
accompanying text.
10. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 862. The Zant Court identified two separate stages of
death sentencing, with the consistency requirement applied to the first and the
individualization requirement applied to the second stage. Id. at 878-79. For a




13. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that statutory
system cannot provide any limits on sentencer's discretion to consider and give
effect to all relevant mitigating evidence offered by defendant) with Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that statutory system must
provide some limits on sentencer's discretion). For a further discussion of this
contradiction, see infra notes 60-63, 78-83, 177-83, 192-97 and accompanying text.
14. See Calins, 114 S. Ct. at 1128 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
stated that a sentencing scheme in compliance with the Court's consistency re-
quirement "would also restrict the sentencer's discretion to such an extent that the
sentencer would be unable to give full consideration to the unique characteristics
of each defendant and the circumstances of the offense" as the individualization
requirement mandates. Id. at 1136 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Further, any statute
or procedure that complied with the individualization requirement would
" 'thro[w] open the back door to arbitrary and irrational sentencing' " in violation
of the consistency requirement and the Eighth Amendment. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 494 (1993) (Thomas,J, con-
curring)). For a further discussion of the conflict between the two requirements,
see infra notes 60-63, 78-83, 177-83, 192-97 and accompanying text.
15. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per
curiam). In response to Furman's mandate that sentencer discretion be limited,
some state legislatures enacted wholly mandatory death sentencing statutes. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 328-31 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discuss-
ing Louisiana's mandatory sentencing procedures); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing North Carolina's
19951 NOTE 1465
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blind eye to the Eighth Amendment's other mandate-that sentencer dis-
cretion to take into account individualzed circumstances not be overly lim-
ited. 16 Similarly, a statutory system that meets the Court's modern
individualization requirement, by allowing complete sentencer discretion
to choose who among those eligible will actually be sentenced to death,
gives no consideration to the Eighth Amendment's mandate that sentenc-
ing results be consistent. 17 Thus, rather than safeguarding the Eighth
Amendment, the Court's requirements allow arbitrariness to enter
through a "back door" that is always left open.1 8
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
only heightened the likelihood of such an outcome. 19 In United States v.
Cheely, the Ninth Circuit relied on the consistency requirement to advocate
complete limitation on sentencer discretion. 20 At the same time, the
mandatory sentencing procedures). The Court, however, invalidated these stat-
utes. See Howe, supra note 9, at 387 n.251 ("Under the [narrowing test], states
should be able to make the death penalty mandatory for aggravated murder. But
this is precisely the approach... that the Court has struck down on several occa-
sions." (citing (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Washington v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 906 (1976); (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976) (plurality opinion))). The Court struck down these mandatory death pen-
alty statutes based on the individualization requirement. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280,
305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325.
Interestingly, the Furman decision actually suggested that this form of legisla-
tive response was appropriate. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(implying that "automatic" death sentencing procedures would be acceptable).
Specifically, the Furman Court criticized the Georgia and Texas death sentencing
procedures on the grounds that they did "not provide[ ] that the death penalty
shall be imposed upon all those who are found guilty of forcible rape . .. [a]nd
(did] not ordain [ ] that death shall be the automatic punishment for murder." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
For a further discussion of mandatory death penalty statutes, see infra notes
54-56. For a detailed explanation of the separate sentencing stages and their re-
quirements, see discussion of Zant infra notes 64-68, 84-87 and accompanying text.
16. See Pemy, 492 U.S. at 318 (stating that State may not "prevent the sen-
tencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's
background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigate
against imposing the death penalty" (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Thus, no limita-
tions on sentencer discretion may be made in this area. For a further discussion of
Peny, see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
17. Compare Penry, 492 U.S. at 302 with Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. For a detailed
comparison of the holdings of the two cases, see supra note 13. For a further dis-
cussion of Penry, see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
18. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 912 (1993) (Thomas,J., concurring)
(discussing Court's contradictory Eighth Amendment arbitrariness requirements
and concluding: "[W]e have thrown open the back door to arbitrary and irra-
tional sentencing").
19. For a further discussion of the confusion in the area of law, as noted by
legal scholars and Supreme Court Justices, see infra note 192 and accompanying
text.
20. United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The narrow-
ing must be such that it forecloses the prospect of cruel and unusual punishment
from 'wanton or freakish' imposition of the death penalty.") (emphasis added).
1466
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court failed to consider the individualization requirement or its underly-
ing ideas.2 1 Thus, instead of harmonizing the two requirements, Cheely
further intensified the conflict between the Constitutional mandates of
consistency and individualization. 22
This Casenote discusses the history of judicial restriction on arbitrary
sentencing in the United States, specifically focusing on how Cheely at-
tempts to prohibit arbitrary death sentencing through drastic limitation of
sentencer discretion.2 3 Part II of this Casenote traces the development of
the Eighth Amendment's protection against arbitrary application of the
death penalty.2 4 Part III describes the facts of Cheely25 and details the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of prior caselaw in this area.26 Part IV focuses
upon the inadequacies of the court's analysis. 27 Part V discusses the im-
For a discussion of the facts in Cheely, see infra notes 91-100 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the majority's analysis in Cheely, see infra notes 101-20 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion's analysis in Cheely,
see infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit in Cheely stated
that
[w]hen juries are presented with a broad class, composed of persons of
many different levels of culpability, and are allowed to decide who among
them deserves death, the possibility of aberrational decisions as to life or
death is too great. The statute before us is unconstitutional because it
utterly fails to foreclose this prospect.
Id. (emphasis added). This surpasses the level of control on jury decision-making
endorsed previously by the Supreme Court. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (stating that
concern is for "wholly arbitrary" sentencing decisions); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 248 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that concern
is for "untrammeled discretion"). For a further discussion of the focus of Furman
and Gregg, see infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
21. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1442 (applying "Death Penalty Jurisprudence" but
not analyzing federal mail-bombing legislation's compliance with individualization
requirement).
22. The two mandates of complete limitation on sentencer discretion and
lack of discretion are in direct contradiction. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
340 (1989) (finding that sentencer had to have discretion to consider and give
effect to all "factor[s] that may well lessen a defendant's culpability for a capital
offense"); see also State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1974). In Winkle, the
court asked the Supreme Court to lead it out of the "morass" created by Furman
and its progeny, stating, "[t]o say that Furman has created a (expletive deleted)
quandary for state legislatures and courts is to put it mildly." Id. For a further
discussion of Penry, see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of how Cheely drastically limits sentencer discretion, see
infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the permissible
range of limitation on sentencer discretion, see infra notes 48-59 and accompany-
ing text.
24. For a discussion of the development of Eighth Amendment arbitrariness
interpretation, see infra notes 30-90 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the facts of Cheely, see infra notes 91-100 and accompa-
nying text.
26. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in- Cheely, see infra notes
101-20 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon prior case law, see
infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text. For inadequacies in this reliance, see
infra notes 133-59, 172-83 and accompanying text.
1995] NOTE 1467
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pact Cheely will have upon Eighth Amendment analysis, the role of the
judiciary in interpreting legislative enactments and recent federal legisla-
tion expanding use of the death penalty.2 8 Part VI concludes that, be-
cause Cheely unconstitutionally restricts sentencer discretion and
misinterprets the concepts underlying prior caselaw, the decision inade-
quately safeguards criminal defendants from arbitrary death sentencing
procedures. 29
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OFJUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON
ARBITRARY SENTENCING
A. The Conflict Is Created: Furman v. Georgia30 and Woodson v.
North Carolina3
l
The Eighth Amendment prohibits governmental imposition of "cruel
and unusual" punishment.3 2 Due to its severity and finality, the death
penalty is clearly a unique form of punishment.3 3 Although the Supreme
28. For a discussion of Cheely's likely impacts, see infra notes 184-214 and ac-
companying text.
29. For this Casenote's conclusion that Cheely fails to protect criminal defend-
ants from arbitrary death sentences, see infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
30. 408 U.S. 238 (per curiam) (1972).
31. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required . . .nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). The Eighth Amendment prohibition
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 n.6 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-67 (1962).
33. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion); see
also Howe, supra note 9, at 395; cf. Randall K. Packer, Note, Struck by Lightning: The
Elevation of Procedural Form Over Substantive Rationality in Capital Sentencing Proceed-
ings, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 641, 646 (1993-94) ("Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one
of only a year or two." (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05). Several Justices
made similar statements in the Furman decision. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. Jus-
tice Brennan stated, "[d]eath is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated
killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the
executed person's humanity." Id. at 290 (Brennan,J., concurring). Justice Stewart
came to a similar conclusion. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The penalty of
death . . .is unique in its total irrevocability."). The Court concluded that the
death penalty should be treated uniquely in stages, with Furman representing the
first time heightened procedural requirements were "elevated to the status of a
doctrine." See NARELL & HARDY, supra note 2, at 30.
The majority of United States jurisdictions have capital punishment statutes.
DEATH Row, U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 1 (Fall
1995) [hereinafter DEATH Row, U.S.A.]. The forty capital punishment jurisdic-
tions are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wyoming, U.S. Government and U.S. Military. Id. Thirteen jurisdic-
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Court has found that application of the death penalty does not violate the
Eighth Amendment per se,3 4 it closely scrutinizes capital sentencing for
Eighth Amendment violations.3 5
tions, however, do not have capital punishment statutes. Id. These are: Alaska,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. Of these
thirteen, a handful may soon adopt capital punishment statutes. See N. Y Bid Puts
Focus on Death Penalty Efforts, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1995, at 22 (predicting that
"other states without the death penalty-particularly Iowa, Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts" will pass death penalty laws in near future).
34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We hold
that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed
... ."); see also Hintze, supra note 2, at 399 ("In Gregg the Court specifically held for
the first time that the Eighth Amendment does not per se prohibit the death
penalty.").
The Court has not been unanimous, however, in its conclusion that the death
penalty is not per se unconstitutional. In Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall
stated that the death penalty could not be constitutionally imposed under any cir-
cumstances. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305, 360 (containing statements, in separate con-
currences, of Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall that death penalty is
unconstitutional in all circumstances). After Furman, Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall continued to adhere to their belief that the death penalty is per se unconsti-
tutional, despite the contrary belief of the Court's majority. See, e.g., Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
concurring) ("I continue to believe that the death penalty is in all circumstances
cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
Further, other Justices agreed with Justices Brennan and Marshall. First, Jus-
tice White expressed a changed view in Godfrey. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 438 (White,
J., dissenting) ("[I] believe that the death penalty may not constitutionally be im-
posed even if it were possible to do so in an even handed manner. But events since
Gregg make that possibility seem increasingly remote.").
Second, at the end of his tenure, Justice Blackmun fully revised his conclusion
on the per se constitutionality of the death penalty. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct.
1127, 1129-30 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that because of
Court's failure to reconcile conflicting requirements, the death penalty is per se
unconstitutional); see also Aaron Epstein, After Twenty Years, Blackmun Rejects the
Death Penalty, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 23, 1994, at 5A ("An anguished Supreme Court
Justice Harry Blackmun, who for more than 20 years voted to enforce the death
penalty in scores of cases, vowed Tuesday that he never will do it again."). For a
thorough treatment of the death penalty moral debate and the death penalty's
constitutionality, see generally THE DEATH PENALT. OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Carol
Wekesser ed., 1991).
35. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[The]
qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree
of reliability when the death sentence is imposed."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 ("When
a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that
every safeguard is observed." (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result))); see also
Hintze, supra note 2, at 399 ("[T] he Gregg decision makes clear that in order for a
statute to pass constitutional muster, the death penalty must be surrounded by an
especially heightened level of procedural safeguards .... "); Packer, supra note 33,
at 641 (noting Supreme Court statement that qualitative difference of death sen-
tence requires special "safeguards [that] are necessary to ensure that sentences of
death comply with the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments");
Lori K Redmond, Comment, Walton v. Arizona: The Supreme Court Clarifies the
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Range Within Which a State's Death Penalty Must Fall in Order to Survive a Constitutional
Challenge, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147 (1991) ("The finality of carrying out a
death sentence highlights the need for detailed and specific guidance when impos-
ing a death sentence.").
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has had few opportunities to scrutinize federal
capital sentencing procedures, partly because, only a small number of federal
crimes have even authorized death sentences. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Drugs and
Death: Congress Authorizes the Death Penalty for Certain Drug-Related Murders, 18 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 47 (1992). Prior to 1972, there were a number of federal laws authorizing
death sentences. Id. at n.5. These included: 18 U.S.C. §§ 32-34 (1994) (destruc-
tion of aircraft, aircraft facilities, motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities where
death results); 18 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1994) (murder of Member of Congress or
Member-of-Congress-elect); 18 U.S.C. § 351(b) (1994) (kidnapping Member of
Congress or Member-of-Congress-elect where death results); 18 U.S.C. § 794
(1994) (espionage); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (murder within special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (murder of speci-
fied federal employees); 18 U.S.C. § 1751(a) (1994) (murder of President or
others in line of succession); 18 U.S.C. § 1751(b) (1994) (kidnapping President or
individual in line of succession where death results); 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970) (rape
within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of United States), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 879(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3623 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-654,
§ 3(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3663 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1994) (murder or kidnap-
ping in course of bank robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994) (treason); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-213, § 16(w)-(ee), Dec. 8, 1983, 97 Stat.
1463 (aircraft hijacking where death results). Id. (citing S. RP. No. 554, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 n.6 (1980); 8. REP. No. 721, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974)).
In 1972, however, Furman invalidated all then-existing death penalty sentenc-
ing procedures, presumably including the federal capital punishment statutes. See
Christian D. Marr, Note, Criminal Law: An Evolutionary Analysis of the Role of Statu-
tory Aggravating Factors in Contemporary Death Penalty Jurisprudence-From Furman to
Blystone, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 77, 77-78 (1992) (stating that Furman "implicitly" inval-
idated all existing death penalty statutes). In 1974, Congress reenacted one of the
federal death penalty statutes, concerning aircraft piracy when death results.
Tobolowsky, supra, at 47 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i), (n) (1974)). "To comply with
the presumed Furman Court mandate to avoid arbitrary and totally discretionary
imposition of the death penalty, Congress established a bifurcated guilt/sentenc-
ing proceeding" relying upon statutorily listed aggravating circumstances. Id. (cit-
ing 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c) (1994)). Eleven years later, Congress enacted its second
post-Furman death penalty legislation, amending the Uniform Code of Military jus-
tice to authorize a death sentence for military personnel convicted of certain ag-
gravated forms of espionage. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1988)). In 1988,
Congress approved its first new death penalty legislation, authorizing the death
sentence for drug-related "continuing criminal enterprises." Id. at 47 n.35 & 36
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1988)); see also Acosta, supra note 2, at 596 (discussing
bill's history in detail). Although this bill over-complies with the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment requirements, one scholar predicted it "will likely be [the
source] of frequent litigation" due to the large number of defendants it is likely to
encompass. Tobolowsky, supra, at 47' n.87-89.
Along with the historically small number of federal death penalty statutes, fed-
eral prosecutors supply another reason for the Supreme Court's limited scrutiny of
federal death penalty procedures. For many years, federal prosecutors did not
seek a death sentence even when so authorized by federal statute. See Paul D.
Kamenar, Death Penalty Legislation for Espionage and Other Federal Crimes is Unneces-
sary: It just Needs a Little Re-enforcement, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 881, 881 (1989).
The Department of Justice had concluded that all federal death penalty statutes
were per se unconstitutional. Id. In 1988, however, the Department of Justice
revised its opinion, stating that the existing federal statutes authorizing death
1470
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The Supreme Court has developed a set of heightened procedural
safeguards to ensure that capital punishment does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.36 Traditionally, the Supreme Court begins its
Eighth Amendment death penalty analysis by examining contemporary so-
cietal perceptions of punishment.37 Consequently, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment may change. as the nation's views of
punishment shift.38 The Court, however, has consistently relied upon leg-
islative and jury decisions as the foremost mirrors of what punishments
society deems appropriate.3 9
sentences Were not unconstitutional per se. Id. at 882 n.7 (quoting 3(a) U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-10.010 (rev. Oct. 1, 1988)). For a further
discussion of the Department of Justice's reversal on this issue, see infra note 94.
The new willingness of federal prosecutors to seek death sentences when au-
thorized is likely to combine with the growing number of federal capital crimes to
place more prisoners on the federal death row. See Lori Montgomery, As Federal
Death Row Forms, Ground is Broken, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 3, 1994, at C1 (stating that
new federal death row "could get crowded fast" due to quickening pace of federal
prosecutions and passage of 1994 Crime Bill). Prior to 1994, the federal govern-
ment had no need for its own death row. Id. Indeed, the federal government did
not execute a single person for three decades. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ-143496, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, 1992, at 679 (1993). For a discussion of the 1994 Crime Bill, see infra notes
94, 209-14 and accompanying text. For a'discussion of the significance of the
number of federal executions, see infra note 136.
36. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95. For a discussion of these heightened proce-
dural safeguards, see infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. For a general dis-
cussion of the evolution of the execution process through modern times, see
ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS
(1990). For a first-hand description of the modern execution process, see gener-
ally HELEN PREJEAN, C.SJ., DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
37. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). Overwhelmingly, concur-
ring and majority Justices rely upon Trop to support their propositions. See Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Trop,
356 U.S. at 100-01, 172); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,; 242 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]lhe Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from 'the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " (quoting Trop,
356 U.S. at 101)). Further, even dissenting Justices consistently rely upon the Trop
decision. Id. at 383 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101); id. at
409 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (same); id. at 428-29 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same).
38. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreword:
Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 NOTRE D~aiE J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1994).
Justice Brennan stated that "even those who disagree with my ultimate position
[that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se] must acknowledge that the
Eighth Amendment definition of 'cruel and unusual' is not frozen in time." Id. at
6. For a more detailed discussion of changing Eighth Amendment requirements,
see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
39. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (stating that
two crucial indicators of society's evolving opinion regarding punishment are legis-
lative enactments and jury determinations).
Legislative enactments reflect what society deems acceptable because they are
enacted by the "people's chosen representatives." Id. at 294. In addition, it is an
"obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for
1995] NOTE 1471
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In the second part of traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, the
Court measures legislative acts against a series of its own requirements. 40
The Court has identified several types of punishment which violate the
crimes." Furman, 408 U.S. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (" '[Olne of society's most basic tasks is that of
protecting the lives of its citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it
achieves the task is through criminal laws against murder.' " (quoting Gregg, 428
U.S. at 226 (White, J., concurring))).
Juries have posed a difficult problem for courts attempting to use them as a
basis of what society deems acceptable. Typically, modern juries have been reluc-
tant to apply legislatively authorized death sentences. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291
(citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); Henry A. Bedau, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 27 (rev. ed. 1967); Philip E. Mackey, The Inutility of
Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L. REV. 32 (1974)). In-
deed, from 1977 to 1991, only 157 prisoners were executed in the United States.
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ-136946, CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 1991, at 12 (1992). From 1991 to the Fall of 1994, that total rose
to 253. See DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 33, at 1-3. Interestingly, there were
21,676 murders committed in the United States in 1991 alone. FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE U.S.
1993, at 21 (1993). Traditionally, sentences for murder account for the vast major-
ity of executions. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 297 (Brennan, J., concurring); Acosta,
supra note 2, at 600 ("[Slince 1977 virtually all capital sentencing has been re-
served for murder.").
Rather than interpreting juries' reluctance to impose death sentences as a call
for the death penalty to be treated as per se unconstitutional, the Court finds this
to indicate a need for close judicial supervision. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 ("[E]ach
distinct [death sentencing] system must be examined on an individual basis.").
40. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 ("As we have seen ... the Eighth Amendment
demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary
society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic concept of
human dignity at the core of the Amendment.") (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
For a discussion of other cases relying on the Trop decision, see supra note 37.
1472 [Vol. 40: p. 1461
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Eighth Amendment, including barbaric,4 1 unnecessary, 42 excessive 4 3 and
41. Barbarous punishments are those that degrade human dignity. Furman,
408 U.S. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring). Society condemns such punishments
not only for the great level of pain that they induce, but also for their treatment of
"members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and dis-
carded." Id. at 272-75. Because society describes them as "extremely severe," it
follows that barbaric punishments may be considered a form of excessive punish-
ment. See id.
42. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 ("[T]he sanction imposed cannot be so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffer-
ing." (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130, 135-36 (1879))).
The most common theories of penological justification are retribution and
deterrence. Id. When a punishment is without even one of these justifications, it is
invalid as unnecessary. Jodi L. Short & Mark D. Spoto, Project, Twenty-Third An-
nual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1992-1993, 82 GEo. L.J. 1199, 1201 n.2272 (1994) ("If a punishment fails to further
penological goals of retribution or deterrence, it amounts to the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain." (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981))); cf Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 ("[I]n
the absence of more convincing evidence ... the infliction of death as a punish-
ment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally se-
vere."). For a detailed discussion of case law illustrating the Court's treatment of
these penological justifications, see generally Steven G. Gey, Symposium, Justice
Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 67 (1992) (comparing Justice Scalia's
views on penological justification with those of other justices).
43. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (stating that punishment must, at least, not be
"excessive"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910) (stating that
justice requires punishments to be "graduated and proportioned to offense");
Short & Spoto, supra note 42, at 1200-01 ("The Court ... analyz[es] whether a
particular sentence 'amounts to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense.' " (quoting Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion))). This requirement arises from
the emphasis of the amendment's language on excessive punishment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.; see also Project, supra note 4, at 1153 n.2846 ("The Excessive
fines clause of the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of disproportionate
fines in criminal cases." (citing Electro Servs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524,
1530 (11th Cir. 1988); Wisconsin Truck Ctr. v. Volvo White Truck Corp., 692 F.
Supp. 1010, 1019 (W.D. Wis. 1988))).
The proportionality analysis attempts to compare (1) the gravity of the offense
with the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentence actually given with those given
to others convicted of the same or similar offenses in the same jurisdiction, and (3)
the sentence actually given with those given for the same or similar offenses in
other jurisdictions. Id. at 1160 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
The Court has found the death penalty to be disproportionate for any crime
which does not involve the taking of a life. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d
1439, 1457 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (Alarcon,J., dissenting) ("Supreme Court decisions
suggest that the death penalty may not be imposed absent a homicide.") (citing
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker, 433 U.S. at 584; see also Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987) (implying that taking of life must result before
death sentence may be imposed); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (holding death penalty
disproportionate for defendant who aided and abetted bank robbery where death
resulted); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977) (per curiam) (finding
death penalty disproportionate for defendant who engaged in kidnapping and
rape where no death resulted); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977) (per
curiam) (holding death penalty disproportionate for defendant convicted of
rape). Notably, the Court explicitly found that the death penalty is a dispropor-
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arbitrary or capricious punishments.44 If a sentencing scheme results in
such punishment, any presumption of validity based upon social accept-
ance is defeated and the Court may rule the scheme unconstitutional. 45
Modem death penalty regulation focuses on the prevention of arbi-
trary or capricious sentencing.46 In particular, the Court has identified-
two different indicators of arbitrariness in death sentencing procedures:
tionate punishment for rape of an adult woman. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 584. Coker
directly stated that the death penalty is disproportionate for a crime that does not
involve the taking of a life. See id. at 598-99; William L. Menard et al., Twentieth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals'
1989-90, 79 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1126 (1991) ("[C]apital punishment is excessive when
the life of the victim has not been taken." (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (plurality
opinion)).
"The few crimes which do not involve killing but for which federal law autho-
rizes the death penalty are crimes which pose 'broad threats to the security of the
Nation and the people's welfare,' such as treason, espionage, or airline hijackings."
Acosta, supra note 2, at 602 (quoting 135 CONG. REc. S1, 367 (daily ed. Oct. 18,
1989) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.)). For a
detailed discussion of the history of these, and other, federal capital punishment
statutes, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
In addition, the proportionality analysis requires an examination of the de-
fendant's mental culpability. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 137 (allowing death sentence
for felony murder, where defendant was not minor participant in felony and ex-
hibited at least reckless disregard for human life). According to Tison, the taking
of life must at least result from a defendant's reckless act before the death penalty
may be imposed. Id. at 157. For a discussion of the role proportionality considera-
tions played in the Cheely majority decision, see infra notes 113-17 and accompany-
ing text.
44. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 ("Furman held that [the death penalty] could
not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.").
45. See id. at 173 ("[Ojur cases make clear that public perceptions of stan-
dards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive."); cf id. at
175 ("[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature
against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity."); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294-95 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[L]egislative measures
adopted by the people's chosen representatives weigh heavily in ascertaining con-
temporary standards of decency.").
46. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (per curiam) (Doug-
las,J., concurring) (stating that there is growing recognition that Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit imposition of arbitrary or discriminatory
punishments (citing ArthurJ. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutiona 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1790 (1970))).
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inconsistency in result4 7 and lack of individualized consideration. 48 To
resolve arbitrariness in sentencing resulting from these two problems, the
Court has concentrated on adjusting the level of discretion given to the
sentencer.
49
47. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. In Furman, Justice Douglas expressed his con-
cern for consistency in death sentencing, stating that "[t]here is evidence that the
provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the language of the
Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned primarily with selective or irregular
application of harsh penalties." Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Bren-
nan voiced a similar concern, stating, "No one has yet suggested a rational basis
that could differentiate in those terms the few who die from the many who go to
prison." Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Following Furman, the Court continued to express concern with consistency in
death sentencing. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 (stating that North Carolina law
that allowed "the jury in its unbridled discretion" to decide upon death sentence
violated Furman);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stat-
ing that Texas law permitted death penalty to be imposed for only most serious
crimes and for same kinds of offenses occuring under same kinds of circum-
stances); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 220-21 (Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ., concur-
ring) ("In Furman, this Court held that as a result of giving the sentencer unguided
discretion to impose or not to impose the death penalty for murder, the penalty
was being imposed discriminatorily, wantonly and freakishly, and so infrequently
that any given death sentence was cruel and unusual.") (footnotes omitted).
The Court did not merely mean predictability when it used the word "consis-
tency." Justice Brennan noted that predictability existed at the time of Furman as
well as today: "[I]t was then, and it remains today, an uncontroverted fact that the
race of a capital defendant and that of his victim play a prominent role in deter-
mining whether the defendant lives or dies." Brennan, supra note 38, at 1 (citing
David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the
Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Samuel R. Gross &
Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing
and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn
L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & Soc'y REV.
587 (1985)). Justice Brennan details the predictable ways in which sentencers rely
upon race to mete out death sentences, writing that:
The vast majority of all murders, upwards of 90%, involve a perpetrator
and victim of the same race. Among the relatively small group of cross-
race murders, "black-on-white" murders are about two and one-quarter
times more common than "white-on-black" murders. However, of the
228 persons executed over the last 17 years, 80 black defendants were
executed for the murders of white victims (35% of all executions), and
only one white defendant was executed for the murder of a black victim
(0.44% of all executions).
Id. at 2 (citing "Victim/Offender Relationship by Race and Sex" tables printed
annually in U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, FED. BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE
U.S.: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1977-1992)). Thus, the Court was motivated by a
concern for disparities-here, based on race-in sentencing selection. See id.
48. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 303-08 (1990); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332-36 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
280. For a further discussion of the individualization requirement, see infra notes
55-59, 75-77 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Penry, see infra
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
49. Compare Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280 (limiting amount sentencer discretion
can be limited) with Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (limiting sentencer discretion); see also
Sundby, supra note 5, at 1148. Sundby states that:
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First, a capital sentencing procedure violates the Eighth Amendment
if it gives the sentencer so much discretion that inconsistent results may
occur.50 In 1972, with Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has based its eighth amendmentjuris-
prudence governing the death penalty on two fundamental command-
ments. The first commandment of "guided discretion" requires that the
sentencer's discretion be narrowly guided as to which circumstances sub-
ject a defendant to the imposition of the death penalty. The second com-
mandment of "individualized consideration" mandates that the sentencer
be allowed to consider all evidence concerning the offender and the of-
fense that might argue for a sentence less than death.
Id. (emphasis added).
Generally, the courts discount other sources of discretion in death sentencing,
such as prosecutors, who decide whether to seek the death penalty, or state gover-
nors, who decide whether to grant sentence commutation. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at
348-50 (White, J., dissenting) ("Of course, someone must exercise discretion and
judgment as to what charges are to be filed and against whom; but this essential
process is nothing more than the rational enforcement of the State's criminal law
and the sensible operation of the criminal justice system."); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 279
(White, J., concurring) ("Nor... am I convinced that this conclusion should be
modified because of the alleged discretion which is exercisable by other major
functionaries in the State's criminal justice system."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199, 225
(Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring) ("[D] efendants will escape the
death penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the offense is
not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently strong. This does not
cause the system to be standardless ...."). But see BLACK, supra note 9, at 21
("[T]he official choices-by prosecutors, judges, juries, and governors-that di-
vide those who are to die from those who are to live are . . . often . . .made ...
under no standards at all or under pseudo-standards without discoverable mean-
ing."); Julie Rigby, The Price ofJustice; You've Heard the Pros and Cons on Capital Pun-
ishment. Here's the Bottom Line, CHi. TmB., May 8, 1994, at C8 ("Whether a person is
tried for execution depends on the state and county where the crime occurred and
on the prevailing political winds of the state's attorney's office. Who the victims
are may also influence whether the prosecution decided to seek death."). In Gregg,
the Court stated:
The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the
issues before us. At each of these stages an actor in the criminal justice
system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from considera-
tion as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with
the decision to impose death sentence on a specific individual who had
been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in any of our cases suggests
that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the
Constitution.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. Thus, the Court attempted to clarify its holding in Furman,
to mandate limitation on discretion to impose a death sentence, rather than discre-
tion to not impose the death penalty. See id. This attempt, however, can also be
viewed as an effort to justify the Woodson and Roberts decisions, handed down the
same day, which granted sentencers the discretion to provide an individualized
determination of whether the death sentence should be imposed. See Roberts, 428
U.S. at 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280. For a further discussion of the Woodson and
Roberts decisions, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. For a detailed list-
ing of the discretionary stages in capital sentencing, which range from the decision
whether to arrest the defendant to the governor's decision whether to grant a par-
don or commutation, see NAK.LL & HAMV, supra note 2, at 10-11.
50. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. The Court was particularly concerned with
the inconsistency in existing death sentencing procedures. See id. at 309-10 (Stew-
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declared the Georgia and Texas capital sentencing procedures unconstitu-
tional because their application was producing inconsistent results.51
These states' capital punishment schemes incorporated no statutory aggra-
vating circumstances, allowed for no consideration of mitigating evidence
and permitted the jury to choose between several alternative punish-
ments. 52 The Court held these procedures unconstitutional because they
art,J., concurring) ("These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual .... [Tihe petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has been imposed.").
In Furman, each Justice wrote his own separate opinion. Id. at 238. There
were five separate concurrences and four separate dissents, none of which any
other justice joined. Id. BecauseJustices Brennan and Marshall concurred on the
grounds that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional, the Douglas, Stewart
and White concurrences are the most important. See id. For a detailed discussion
of these opinions, see Mann, supra note 5, at 501-06, and NAKELL & HARDY, supra
note 2, at 22-26. As a result of its array of opinions, Furman "engendered confusion
as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord with the
Eighth Amendment." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599.
51. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. Furman implicitly overturned a Supreme Court
decision made only one year earlier, which held that the sentencing procedures in
question were constitutional. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
The McGautha Court held that the jury need not be provided with any "governing
standards" before it imposed the death penalty. Id. at 185-86; see also Jeffrey J.
Pokorak, "Death Stands Condemned": Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty, 27 CAL. W.
L. REv. 239, 248 (1990-91) ("In McGautha, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of both the unbridled jury sentencing and the unitary trial system against four-
teenth amendment challenges." (citing McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207, 217)).
Furman outlawed not only the Georgia and Texas sentencing schemes, but
also all other existing death penalty statutes. NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 2, at 26
& n.61; Marr, supra note 35, at 77-78; Packer, supra note 33, at 643. In total,
Furman invalidated the capital sentencing procedures of 39 states and reversed
more than 600 death sentences. Clarke, supra note 2, at 423-24.
As a result, Furman may be viewed as the beginning of Supreme Court capital
punishment activism. See HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 35, 111 (1977) (stating that Court in Gregg "put aside [its]
personal scruples against the death penalty in the name of federalism, judicial re-
straint, legislative deference"); WELSH S. WHrrE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINE-
TIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1991)
(stating that Supreme Court's regulation of death penalty truly got under way with
Furman); Clarke, supra note 2, at 408 n.4 (stating that decision would have wide
implications on "root principles of stare decisis, federalism, judicial restraint,
and-most importantly-separation of powers") (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 417-18
(Powell, J., dissenting)); see also Pokorak, supra, at 240 ("The 'cruel and unusual'
punishment clause of the eighth amendment became the constitutional vehicle for
federal supervisory control of the states' administration of capital cases."); Richard
A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1983) (stating
that court is activist when it "enlarg[es] its power at the expense of any other gov-
ernment institution"); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1152 ("Furman was the legal
equivalent of the Big Bang for capital punishment ...."). For a more detailed
discussion of judicial activism, see infra note 201 and accompanying text.
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 n.8. "Georgia law ... left the jury a choice be-
tween the death penalty, life imprisonment, or 'imprisonment and labor in the
penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years.' " Id. (citing GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior toJuly 1, 1969) and GA. CRAm.
1995] NOTE 1477
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allowed the sentencer to exercise "untrammeled" discretion.53 Thus, for
the first time, the Court required that a sentencing scheme adequately
limit sentencer discretion to pass constitutional muster.54
Second, a capital sentencing procedure also violates the Eighth
Amendment if it gives the sentencer too little discretion to consider an
individual's characteristics and the particular circumstances of a case.
55
Just four years after Furman, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme
Court determined that the Constitution mandates individualized consider-
ation in sentencing.56 The North Carolina death sentencing procedure
considered in Woodson incorporated no statutory aggravating circum-
CODE § 26-2001 (1971 rev.) (effective July 1, 1969)). The Texas law similarly
"provide[d] that a 'person guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confine-
ment in the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not less than five.' " Id.
(citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1925)).
53. See id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that sentencer must not
have "untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die"). Justice
Stewart expressed a similar concern. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply
conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the inflic-
tion of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."). Justice White, too, expressed a con-
cern for the effects of unregulated sentencer discretion. Id. at 313 (White,J., con-
curring) ("[A]s the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty is so
infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of sub-
stantial service to criminal justice.").
In subsequent decisions, the Court interpreted Furman to require limitations
on sentencer discretion. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (stating
that Furman and its progeny were "concerned with insuring that sentencing discre-
tion in capital cases is channeled so that arbitrary and capricious results are
avoided"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 ("Furman mandates . . .that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.").
54. See Gregg 428 U.S. at 189; Furman, 408 U.S. at 248; see also Lori L. Nader,
Note, Walton v. Arizona: The Confusion Surrounding the Sentencing of Capital Defend-
ants Continues, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 475, 476 (1991) ("Furman stands for the princi-
ple that, for a death sentence to be constitutional, the sentencer's discretion to
impose death must be statutorily directed." (footnote omitted));John C. Shawde,
Comment, Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 357, 361 (1984) ("The Furman decision indicated that total discretion vested
in the sentencing authority leads to arbitrariness .... ).
55. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Marr, supra note 35, at
86-87.
56. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. The Woodson Court stated:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determina-
tions generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitu-
tional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires considera-
tion of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Woodson was one of five decisions handed
down on the same day in 1972. See id.; see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325 (finding
sentencing system unconstitutional, for lack of individualized consideration);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding sentencing proce-
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stances, did not allow for consideration of mitigating evidence and gave
the jury only one punishment alternative-death. 57 The Woodson Court
held that this sentencing scheme unconstitutionally prevented the sen-
dures constitutional); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion)
'.(same); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (same).
Both of the death sentencing procedures that the Court held unconstitutional
in 1976, based on the individualization requirement, involved mandatory statutes.
See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329 ("[T]he legislature changed this discretionary statute to
a wholly mandatory one, requiring that the death penalty be imposed whenever
the jury finds the defendant guilty of the newly defined crime of first-degree mur-
der."); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287 n.9. ("The mandatory nature of the North Caro-
lina death penalty statute for first-degree murder presents a different question
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
Prior to Woodson, the Court questioned mandatory death sentences. See Wood-
son, 428 U.S. at 296-97 (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) ("[Tihe 'hardship of pun-
ishing with death every crime coming within the definition of murder at common
law, and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a capital conviction, have induced
American legislatures.., to allow some cases of murder to be punished by impris-
onment, instead of by death.'" (citing Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303
(1899); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (stating that Supreme
Court "detailed the evolution of discretionary imposition of death sentences in this
country, prompted by what it termed the American 'rebellion against the com-
mon-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murder-
ers' ")); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("The belief no longer
prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.").
In Woodson and Roberts, the legislatures drafted capital punishment statutes in
an attempt to completely constrain sentencer discretion. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at
330-31 ("Under the former statute, the jury had the unfettered choice in any case
where it found the defendant guilty of murder .... [but now] the jury is required
to determine only whether both conditions existed at the time of the killing .. ");
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302 (stating that North Carolina had tried, but failed because
ofjury nullification, to "withdraw[ ] all sentencing discretion from juries in capital
cases"). As a result, the sentencer in each case was not free to consider an individ-
ual case's facts, as required under the Court's constitutional standard. See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 353-54 (1989). The Court in Penry summed up the inade-
quacies in the different sentencing procedures, stating:
In Furman v. Georgia ...we invalidated Georgia's capital punishment
scheme on the ground that, since there were no standards as to when it
would be applied for a particular crime, it created too great a risk that the
death penalty would be irrationally imposed. Four years later, however,
we struck down the capital sentencing schemes of North Carolina and
Louisiana for the opposite vice-because they unduly constricted sen-
tencing discretion by failing to allow for individualized consideration of
the particular defendant and offense, see Woodson v. North Carolina [and]
Roberts v. Louisiana ....
Id. (citations omitted).
57. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 n.4. The statute at issue in Woodson stated:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment-A murder which
shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other fel-
ony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be pun-
ished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in
the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of
19
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tencer from considering the "character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense."5 8 Thus, the
Court determined that statutory law could not overly restrict a sentencer's
discretion to select among punishment options.5 9
Absent clear delineation of the proper relationship between the
Furman and Woodson holdings, the Court's requirements could create con-
fusion.60 The decisions merely outline two unacceptable extremes in sen-
tencing: total restriction and lack of restriction on sentencer discretion.6 1
Accordingly, in following these two cases the Court has found unconstitu-
tional any sentencing scheme that, taken as a whole, approached either of
not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's
prison.
Id. at 286 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)).
'Originally, the North Carolina murder statute stated:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. A murder
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprison-
ment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony,
shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished
with death: Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court,
the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury. All other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall
be punished with imprisonment of not less than two nor more than thirty
years in the State's prison.'
Id. at 285 n.4 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969)). The statute in this form,
however, gave too much leeway to the jury and was revised to limit the jury's pun-
ishment alternatives to one-death. Id. Under the new statute, after "the return
of a verdict of guilty of any such offense, the court [had to] pronounce a sentence
of death." Id. at 286 n.5.
58. Id. at 304 (stating that process must accord "significance to relevant facts
of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense"); see Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (stating that problem with
mandatory death sentence statute is that it lacks "focus on the circumstances of the
particular offense and the character and propensities of the offender").
Both Woodson and Roberts dealt with mandatory death sentencing schemes. See
id. at 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280. Roberts and Woodson were the only of the five
cases handed down on the same day in 1976 to declare a statute unconstitutional
based on the individualization requirement. Howe, supra note 9, at 370-73 (stating
that Court employed different analysis in these two cases). But see id. at 367
(" [T] he two mandatory statutes would have been least open to attack because they
eliminated all potential for arbitrariness from sentencing proceedings."). For a
further discussion of the two cases, see supra note 56.
59. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
60. Compare Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280 with Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
61. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. In Woodson, the
Court found unconstitutional death sentencing procedures that completely re-
stricted the sentencer's discretion. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280. Previously, in
Furman, the Court found unconstitutional death sentencing procedures that gave
unlimited discretion to the sentencer. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
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these. extremes. 62 Although the Court presumably directed sentencing
systems to forge a middle ground between limitation on and allowance of
sentencer discretion, it has failed to more exactly specify the parameters of
this middle ground.
63
62. See Hintze, supra note 2, at 416 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420(1980) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion)). But see Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 908 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) ("[B]y eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants
equally, a mandatory death penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable legislative
response to the concerns expressed in Furman.").
63. See Sundby, supra note 5, at 1153. Sundby stated:
Gregg and its companion cases thus laid out the basic eighth amendment
parameters for capital punishment: the sentencer's discretion must be
controlled as to when the death penalty can be imposed, but sufficient
discretion must remain so that the death penalty is not imposed without
an opportunity to consider the specific circumstances of the defendant
and the crime.
Id. For the two requirements to be met simultaneously, therefore, the statute must
strike a careful balance. See Mann, supra note 5, at 495 n.6 (stating that Furman
and Woodson establish "a spectrum of permissible outcomes... with ... the Court
accepting statutes that fall in the middle" (citing Sundby, supra note 5, at 1161;
Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 325; Leading Cases,
104 HARV. L. REv. 129, 139-40 (1990)); Clarke, supra note 2, at 424-25 ("[The
Court's] resolution of the discretion dilemma ... is ultimately as simplistic as Gold-
ilocks's approach to dealing with the three bears: complete discretion is too arbi-
trary (Furman), no discretion is just as bad (Roberts and Woodson), but guided
discretion is just right (Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek).") (footnotes omitted).
At no time, however, has the Court prescribed exactly what balancing is re-
quired. See id., at 425 ("What guided discretion entails or what it absolutely re-
quires, however, remains unclear."). In 1978, the Court recognized the confusion
in the area of law and attempted to rectify it. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602
(1978) ("The signals from this Court have not, however, always been easy to deci-
pher. The States now deserve the clearest guidance that the Court can provide; we
have an obligation to reconcile previously differing views in order to provide that
guidance."). The Court stated that a sentencing scheme which individually as-
sesses the culpability of each capital defendant, while still providing standards to
guide the sentencing decision in compliance with Furman, would be constitution-
ally sound. Id. at 600 (citing Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death
Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1690-1710 (1974)).
Post-Lockett decisions, however, confuse the issue once again. Howe, supra
note 9, at 378 ("During the decade after Lockett, the Court continued to ignore the
existence of the rift within its capital sentencing cases."). The decisions require
more than a vague "individual assessment" of a capital defendant's culpability. See
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 307 (1990) (upholding Pennsylvania proce-
dure for "allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence"); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318 (1989) (striking down Texas procedure for failure to
allow sentencer to consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence "relevant to
the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense");
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589 (striking down Ohio procedure for failure to allow sen-
tencer to consider "circumstances of the crime and the record and character of
the offender as mitigating factors").
The trend in these cases is toward an increasing reliance upon sentencer con-
sideration of mitigating circumstances. Today, in order to pass constitutional mus-
ter, a statutory scheme must not prevent a sentencer from hearing and giving
effect to any relevant mitigating evidence. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 302 (holding stat-
ute unconstitutional because it did not allow jury to give effect to mitigating evi-
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B. The Conflict Intensifies: Zant v. Stephens64 and Penry v. Lynaugh 65
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has further refined Furman's consis-
tency requirement. 66 In Zant v. Stephens, the Court concluded that statu-
tory systems need not specifically instruct the jury on how to sentence a
defendant. 67 Instead, statutory systems need only provide guidance on
dence of defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse). Thus, while the
analysis is more focused-in the sense that it centers upon one area, consideration
of mitigating factors-it is at the same time more broad, by mandating that the
discretion of the sentencer be completely unfettered in this one area. See id. This
brings the requirement into potential conflict with Furman's requirement that the
jury's discretion not be entirely unfettered. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. For a
further discussion of the Court's holding in Furman, see supra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text. For the Model Penal Code list of mitigating factors, see infra
note 76.
64. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). The Georgia sentencing scheme at issue in Zant
used statutory aggravating circumstances to determine a defendant's eligibility for
a death sentence, but did not allow consideration of mitigating evidence. Id. at
865 n.1. The relevant Georgia statute stated:
In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be
authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his
instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or
aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the
following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by
the evidence: (1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or
kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person
who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions...
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim ...
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement.
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978)).
65. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The Texas sentencing scheme at issue employed no
statutory aggravating circumstances. Id. at 316. Instead, the scheme limited the
death penalty to intentional and knowing murders in five circumstances. Id.
Further, Texas law required the jury to answer three questions affirmatively before
imposing a death sentence. Id. The Court found that the sentencing scheme was
adequate even though it did not specifically employ statutory aggravating
circumstances. Id. The Court stated that "although Texas had not adopted a list
of statutory aggravating factors that the jury must find before imposing the death
penalty, 'its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death
sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose.' " Id. (quoting
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
66. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987); Zant, 462 U.S. at 862; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
67. Zant, 462 U.S. at 875. Relying upon the holding in Gregg, the Zant Court
validated a sentencing procedure that "clearly did not channel the jury's discretion
by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances." Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153). The Court
stated that "[S]pecific standards for balancing aggravating against mitigating cir-
cumstances are not constitutionally required." Id. at 876 n.13 (citing Jurek, 428
U.S. at 262).
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who may be sentenced. 68 Ultimately, the Court found that Furman only
ordered the state to narrow the class of persons eligible for death. 69
A state may accomplish the requisite narrowing in a variety of ways. 70
The state legislature may narrowly define the relevant offense.7 1 Alterna-
68. Id. at 878 ("Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circum-
stances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative defini-
tion: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty."). The
Court in Zant identified two separate stages of death penalty sentencing: (1) the
class of persons eligible to receive death sentences is sketched out; and (2) persons
are selected from that class to receive the death sentence. Id. at 878-79. The
Furman requirement is met through narrowing in the first stage, while the Woodson
requirement is met through individualized consideration in the second stage. Id.
Thus, the two requirements remain separate from each other. Id.
69. Id.
70. Compare id. at 862 (upholding sentencing scheme using at least one statu-
tory aggravating circumstance) and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (upholding sentencing
scheme using various statutory aggravating circumstances to meet Furman require-
ment) and Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same) and
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262 (same) with Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 231 (upholding statutory
system using narrow statutory definition to meet Furman requirement) and McCles-
key, 481 U.S. at 279 (same).
71. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 437 ("In Texas, the definition of capital mur-
der substitutes for the list of statutory aggravating circumstances the Supreme
Court deemed necessary in Gregg and Profitt. Thus, eligibility for the death penalty
is determined at the guilt-innocence phase of a capital murder trial rather than at
the penalty phase.") (footnote omitted).
Furman did not specifically answer the .question of whether the Constitution
required statutory aggravating circumstances. United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d
1439, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994) (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Later decisions, however, an-
swered this question. Id.; see, e.g., Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 231; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at
279. The Lowenfield Court stated:
The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to find the existence of
an aggravating circumstance in addition [to finding the elements of the
crime] is no part of the constitutionally required narrowing process, and
so the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the ele-
ments of the crime does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm.
There is no question but that the Louisiana scheme narrows the class of
death-eligible murderers and then at the sentencing phase allows for con-
sideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of discretion.
The Constitution requires no more.
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 246. According to the, Court in Lowenfield, the Constitution
requires narrowing and individualized consideration. See id. The narrowing need
not be performed by statutory aggravating circumstances. See id.; see also Cheely, 36
F.3d at 1455 (Alarcon, J., dissenting); cf Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1501-02
(3d Cir. 1994) (relying upon Lowenfield to hold that statutory aggravating circum-
stance could repeat element of crime; when crime was felony-murder and aggravat-
ing circumstance was also felony-murder); Johnson v. Singletary, 932 F.2d 1360
(lth Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 961 (1991); Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d
772 (Del. 1994) (same).
Further, two Ninth Circuit cases agree that the narrowing function may be
performed through narrow statutory definition. See McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d
1525, 1538 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that statute must, at stage of legislative defini-
tion, "carefully delimit.., classes of crimes for which the death penalty is permissi-
ble punishment," without requiring statutory aggravating circumstances), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 9012 (1988); United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1984) (stating that "the guidelines plainly required by Gregg and its compan-
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tively, the legislature may broadly define the offense, but then include a
list of aggravating circumstances to guide the sentencer's determination. 72
ion cases must be contained in the statute" but not requiring statutory aggravating
circumstances).
Although the Cheely majority interpreted Harper to require aggravating circum-
stances, the Ninth Circuit previously refused to read Harper in this way when decid-
ing McKenzie. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1458 (Alarcon,J., dissenting) (citing McKenzie, 842
F.2d at 1542 n.35). Harper should not be interpreted to require aggravating cir-
cumstances because it would then contradict Supreme Court precedent. Id.
72. See generally Marr, supra note 35, at 89-95 (discussing cases using statutory
aggravating circumstances (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990);
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 862;
Profitt, 428 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion))). "[A]n aggravating circumstance is
simply a factor that the sentencer must find before it can impose the penalty of
death." Clarke, supra note 2, at 428. Most states spell out special aggravating cir-
cumstances, which are relatively specific and narrow, in the capital sentencing stat-
ute. Id. But see BLACK, supra note 9, at 66-67 (arguing that statutory aggravating
circumstances are so vaguely worded that they are "nonstandards").
The majority of states use statutory aggravating circumstances in the sentenc-
ing process. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39 to 59 (1975) (8 listed); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703 (1989 & Supp.) (10 listed); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-1301 to 1304
(Michie 1987) (7 listed); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 to 190.4 (West 1988) (19 "spe-
cial circumstances" to be found when sentencer determines guilt); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 & Supp. 1995) (13 listed); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (9 listed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995) (22 listed);
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1992 & Supp. 1996) (12 listed); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 to
32 (1990) (10 listed); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987) (10 listed); ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
720, para. 5/9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995) (14 listed); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-
9 (1986 & Supp. 1995) (14 listed); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin 1990)
(7 listed); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905-905.9 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996) (12
listed); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1992) (10 listed); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101 (1994) (8 listed); Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030-032 (1979 & Supp. 1996) (17
listed); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 to 305 (1995) (9 listed); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2519 to 2523 (1990) (8 listed); NEV. REv. STAT. § 175.552 to 562 (1992)
(none specifically listed); NEv. CRIMES & PUNISH. tit. 15, § 200.033 to .035 (1992 &
Supp. 1995) (10 listed); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (10
listed); NJ. REv. STAT. § 2C:11-3(c) (1985 & Supp. 1995) (11 listed); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-1 to 6 (Michie 1978) (7 listed); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983)
(11 listed); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 & 04 (Anderson 1993) (8 listed);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 to 12 (1983) (8 listed); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150
(1990) (3 listed); PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d) (1995 Supp.) (17 listed); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1995) (10 listed); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 23A-27A-1 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (10 listed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203
(1991) (12 listed); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1988) (2 or 3 ques-
tions); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (1994) (17 categories of capital
murder); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 to 264.5 (Michie 1995) (5 listed); WASH. REv.
CODE § 10.95.020 to .080 (1990 & Supp. 1996) (12 listed); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-102
(1977 & Supp. 1995) (12 listed).
The Model Penal Code provides the following list of aggravating
circumstances:
Aggravating Circumstances
a. The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of
imprisonment.
b. The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
1484
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Both procedures, the Court has held, are acceptable means of narrowing
the class of persons eligible for death. 73 In addition, because it deter-
mines the constitutionality of each procedure on a case-by-case basis, the
Court may determine that additional legislative narrowing attempts are
also legitimate. 74
While refining Furman's consistency requirement, the Court has also
refined Woodson's individualization requirement. 75 In Penry v. Lynaugh,
c. At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
d. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
e. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or devi-
ate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or
kidnapping.
f. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
g. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
h. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting ex-
ceptional depravity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
Mailing a bomb could apply, most obviously, under circumstance (d). See FED-
ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BOMB SUMMARY, 1992, at 42
(1993) [hereinafter BOMB SUMMARY] (generally discussing great risk bombings
present). The majority of defendants, however, become eligible for the death pen-
alty because of the felony-murder and vile murder rules. David C. Baldus et al.,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge
to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133, 138-39 (1986). For a further discus-
sion of inherent danger in mailing a bomb, see infra notes 162-64 and accompany-
ing text.
73. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 231 (holding that statutory definition per-
formed constitutionally required narrowing); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 280 (same);
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262 (same). In Jurek, the Court specifically noted that although
Texas did not employ statutory aggravating circumstances like Georgia and Flor-
ida, the state still operated under constitutional death-sentencing procedures. Id.
at 270 ("While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances
... its action in narrowing... serves much the same purpose."). For a further
discussion of the Court's treatment of statutory aggravating circumstances, see in-fta notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
74. See Blystone, 494 U.S. at 309 ("The fact that other States have enacted
different forms of death penalty statutes which also satisfy constitutional require-
ments casts no doubt on Pennsylvania's choice."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("There is no perfect procedure for deciding in
which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death."); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 195 ("We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described proce-
dures would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system con-
structed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman,
for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis.") (citation
omitted).
75. See Blystone, 494 U.S. at 307 (upholding Pennsylvania procedure for "al-
lowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence"); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 318 (1989) (striking down Texas procedure for failure to allow sen-
tencer to consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence "relevant to the de-
fendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense");
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the Court held that a statute could not prevent the sentencer from consid-
ering and giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence. 76 Thus, the
state cannot limit the sentencer's discretion in this area. 77
In the years since the Furman and Woodson decisions, the Court has
not provided a means of striking a balance between the two contradictory
Eighth Amendment requirements. 78 In fact, the Court has interpreted
the consistency and individualization requirements such that they are mu-
tually exclusive. 79 On the one hand, a statutory scheme must limit sen-
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586 (striking down Ohio procedure for failure to allow sen-
tencer to consider "circumstances of the crime and the record and character of
the offender as mitigating factors").
76. Blystone, 494 U.S. at 305 n.2 (citing Commonwealth v. Holcombe, 498
A.2d 833, 856 n.26 (Pa. 1985)). The Court relied upon its decision in Lockett. Id.
Along these lines, the Model Penal Code did not limit the sentencer to a specific list
of mitigating circumstances, but instead allowed consideration of "any other facts
that [the sentencer) deem[ed] relevant." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code, however, does provide the fol-
lowing list of mitigating circumstances:
Mitigating Circumstances
a. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
b. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
c. The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
d. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his
conduct.
e. The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
f. The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of an-
other person.
g. At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect
or intoxication.
h. The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. § 210.6(4).
77. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 327 (relying upon McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304).
78. See generally United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1451-55 (9th Cir. 1994)
(following Supreme Court and failing to provide new standard for striking balance
in Eighth Amendment interpretation).
79. Compare Penry, 492 U.S. at 304-05 (decining to permit limitation on sen-
tencer discretion to take into account certain evidence when deciding which de-
fendants would receive death sentence) with Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-80
(1983) (requiring limitation on sentencer discretion to determine which defend-
ants could receive death sentence). In 1978,Justice White recognized the possibil-
ity of conflict between Furman's requirement and the notion of allowing
"consideration of all mitigating evidence that bears on the appropriateness of the
death penalty." Sundby, supra note 5, at 1161. In more recent individualized con-
sideration cases, however, "the Court has begun to address the tension directly."
Id. at 1162.
In recent cases, the Court began to recognize the incompatibility of the two
Eighth Amendment requirements. On the one hand, Justice Blackmun found the
two requirements incompatible. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1994)
1486 [Vol. 40: p. 1461
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tencer discretion.8 ° On the other hand, a statutory scheme may not limit
(mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he consistency and rationality promised in
Furman are inversely related to the fairness owed the individual when considering a
sentence of death. A step toward consistency is a step away from fairness."); id. at
1136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he consistency promised in Furman and the
fairness to the individual demanded in Lockett are not only inversely related, but
irreconcilable in the context of capital punishment."); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 363
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting possibility of "an inherent tension" in area of
law).
On the other hand, justice Scalia also found the requirements incompatible.
See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (19,90) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("To ac-
knowledge that 'there perhaps is an inherent tension' between [the Lockett] line of
cases and the line stemming from Furman ... is rather like saying that there was
perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War
II." (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 363 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted))).
Even in the Court's center, other Justices noted the incompatibility of the two
requirements. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
White, Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.) ("Arguably these two lines of cases ... are somewhat
in 'tension' with each other.") (citation omitted); California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (" [T] ension ... has long existed be-
tween the two central principles [of consistency and individualized sentencing] of
our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."). Justice Scalia's criticism of the irrecon-
cilability of the two requirements is the most scathing. For example, he stated that:
Woodson and Lockett are 'rationally irreconcilable with Furman ... I would
not know how to apply . . . both them and Furman-if I wanted to. I
cannot continue to say, in case after case, what degree of "narrowing" is
sufficient to achieve the constitutional objective enunciated in Furman
when I know that objective is in any case impossible of achievement be-
cause of Woodson-Lockett .... Stare decisis cannot command the impossible.
Since I cannot possibly be guided by what seem to me incompatible prin-
ciples, I must reject the one that is plainly in error.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring). Eighth Amendment scholars agree
that inconsistency exists. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 2, at 433 ("How can one pro-
cedure, combining both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, be both discre-
tionary and non-discretionary?").
While so many agree upon the existence of tension between the two require-
ments, they disagree on what course of action the Court should take to remedy the
problem. Justice Scalia advocates eliminating one of the requirements. See Walton,
497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that two principles are incompati-
ble, and one in plain error must be rejected). Justice Blackmun, on the other
hand, believed that there was no way to correct the inconsistency and that the
death penalty should be declared unconstitutional as a result. See Callins, 114 S. Ct.
at 1134-36 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that because premise of Furman will
continue to go unfulfilled, and arbitrariness cannot be expunged from system,
death penalty should be abolished). For a further discussion ofJustice Blackmun's
conclusion that the death penalty should be declared unconstitutional, see infra
notes 178, 197.
The tension recognized in recent cases may be a natural one. Sundby, supra
note 5, at 1208 n.124. Indeed, the "tension between the desire to have certainty
and uniformity in the application of rules and the desire to adapt the rules for
particular individuals runs throughout the law." Id. (citing Compassion and Judging,
22 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 13 (1990)).
80. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 862 (holding that limited function served byjury does
not invalidate statutory scheme under Furman); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
155 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding Georgia statutory system for death penalty
constitutional, because it was carefully drafted statute ensuring adequate informa-
1995] NOTE . 1487
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sentencer discretion.8 1 After Penmy, a constitutionally acceptable sentenc-
ing stage that did not limit sentencer discretion would directly contradict
the original Furman requirement.8 2 Similarly, a statutory definition that
tion and guidance); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and is
unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment).
81. See Peary, 492 U.S. at 303 (stating that jury must be given instructions in-
forming them of evidence such as mental retardation and abuse); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that individualized mitigating factors
must be admitted at trial); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating Louisiana's death penalty statute for failure to apply individ-
ualized consideration); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (holding North Carolina's death penalty statute unconstitutional for fail-
ure to apply individualized consideration); Howe, supra note 9, at 401 ("In one
decision, the Court even declared that the capital sentencer need not be guided by
any standards at the sentencing proceeding if an aggravating circumstance has
already been identified at the guilt-or-innocence stage." (citing Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988))). Justice Scalia noted this contradiction in Walton:
Pursuant to Furman, and in order "to achieve a more rational and
equitable administration of the death penalty," we require that States
"channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that
provide 'specific and detailed guidance.' " In the next breath, however,
we say that "the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion.., to
consider any relevant [mitigating] information offered by the defend-
ant," and that the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained discretion to de-
cide whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the defendant or the
crime indicate that he does not "deserve to be sentenced to death[.]"
The latter requirement quite obviously destroys whatever rationality and
predictability the former requirement was designed to achieve.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
82. Compare Peny, 492 U.S. at 302 with Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. Justice
Thomas stated that Peny was "wrongly decided" and expressed his concern for the
confusion the Penry decision created between the individualization and consistency
requirements. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 904 (1993) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) ("As the most extreme statement in our 'mitigating' line, Penly creates
more than an unavoidable tension; it presents an evident danger."). Justice
Thomas concluded that "[i]n holding that the jury had to be free to deem Penry's
mental retardation and sad childhood relevant for whatever purpose it wished, the
Court has come full circle, not only permitting but requiring what Furman once
condemned." Id. at 912 (quoting Peny, 492 U.S. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
Justice Blackmun also noted the inconsistency between the Court's two re-
quirements. See Calins, 114 S. Ct. at 1134 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Thus, the
Constitution, by requiring a heightened degree of fairness to the individual, and
also a greater degree of equality and rationality in the administration of death,
demands sentencer discretion that is at once generously expanded and severely
restricted."). Justice Blackmun, however, felt that the Penry decision only exposed
the already existing inconsistency between the two Eighth Amendment require-
ments. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that inconsistency between Court's
consistency and individualization requirements "was laid bare" in Peny).
Either way, "[a]fter Peny, the paradox underlying the Court's post-Furman ju-
risprudence was undeniable. Texas had complied with Furman by severely limiting
the sentencer's discretion, but those very limitations rendered Penry's death sen-
tence unconstitutional." Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For a further discussion of
Furman, see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
Penry, see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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complied with the Furman holding and acceptably narrowed the class of
death-eligible defendants eligible would limit sentencer discretion and di-
rectly contradict Penry if measured separately against its individualization
requirement.
8 3
Moreover, the Court has determined that a sentencing system should
not be measured as a whole against the Eighth Amendment for arbitrari-
ness.8 4 Instead, the Court has fractioned application of the Amend-
ment.8 5 Only the sentencing stage where the death-eligible class is
defined must meet the Amendment's consistency mandate, and only the
stage where a defendant is selected from the eligible class must meet the
83. See Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1136. Justice Blackmun stated:
Any statute or procedure that could effectively eliminate arbitrariness
from the administration of death would also restrict the sentencer's dis-
cretion to such an extent that the sentencer would be unable to give full
consideration to the unique characteristics of each defendant and the
circumstances of the offense. By the same token, any statute or proce-
dure that would provide the sentencer with sufficient discretion to con-
sider fully and act upon the unique circumstances of each defendant
would "thro[w] open the back door to arbitrary and irrational
sentencing."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 912 (Thomas, J., con-
curring)). Justice Blackmun concluded that "[a]ll efforts to strike an appropriate
balance between these conflicting constitutional commands are futile because
there is a heightened need for both in the administration of death." Id. (Black-
mun,J., dissenting). For a further discussion ofJustice Blackmun's opinion on the
death penalty, see infra notes 178, 197 and accompanying text.
84. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79 (emphasizing central importance of individu-
alized determination on basis of character of individual and circumstances of
crime); see also Sundby, supra note 5, at 1164 ("Splitting the decision-making pro-
cess into two distinct stages allows the Court to justify treating aggravating and
mitigating factors differently by maintaining that they address distinct aspects of
the sentencer's decision."). There were previous indications that the Court might
split the sentencing procedure into two stages, with a different requirement apply-
ing to each stage. Justice White stated in Gregg that:
As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed
become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are partic-
ularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate as
they are in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circumstance require-
ment, it becomes reasonable to expect that juries-even given discretion
not to impose the death penalty-will impose the death penalty in a sub-
stantial portion of the cases so defined. If they do, it can no longer be
said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly or so infre-
quently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J., concurring). In retrospect, other cases also fore-
shadowed Zant. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(stating that statute must "narrowly limit the sentencer's discretion to consider the
circumstances of the crime and the record and character of the offender as miti-
gating factors");Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stat-
ing that state procedure correctly "guides and focuses the jury's objective
consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the
individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death").
85. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79.
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individualization mandate.8 6 Thus, the Court absolved legislatures from
the seemingly impossible task of designing death sentencing schemes that,
in their entirety, comply with all of the Eighth Amendment's essential
components. 8 7
In United States v. Cheely, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit followed cases narrowing sentencer discretion, such as
Furman and Zant, to strike down legislation as arbitrary because it did not
provide adequate guidance to the sentencer.8 8 The federal mail-bombing
legislation addressed in Cheely incorporated no statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances, allowed for the consideration of mitigating evidence and did
not permit the jury to select from alternative punishments when death
resulted.8 9 The Cheely court invalidated this sentencing system, relying on
the premise of Furman and Zant: sentencer discretion must be limited to
achieve the consistency of result mandated by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.9"
86. The Court's concerns in Furman and Woodson cannot be neatly cordoned
off into the separate stages. See Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1134.(mem.) (BlackmunJ.,
dissenting) ("It is the decision to sentence a defendant to death-not merely the
decision to make a defendant eligible for death-that may not be arbitrary."); Gra-
ham, 113 S. Ct. at 910 (ThomasJ., concurring) ("[P]roviding all relevant informa-
tion for the sentencer's consideration does nothing to avoid the central danger
that sentencing discretion may be exercised irrationally."). For a further discus-
sion of the problems with Zant's two stages, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
87. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (holding that jury must
be permitted to consider all relevant mitigating evidence); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that sentencer must be permitted to consider and give
effect to all relevant mitigating evidence); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586 (holding that
sentencer must be allowed to consider mitigating factors); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155-56
(holding that sentencer must not be left unfettered in punishment decision);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 153, 239-40 (per curiam) (finding that sentencer
must not be given too much discretion in sentencing decision). For a further dis-
cussion of the possibility of striking a balance between the two requirements, see
supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the remote
likelihood of any balancing occurring at the present time, due to the deep rift
between the two requirements, see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
88. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We affirm
the district court's determination that the death penalty provisions ... are uncon-
stitutional because they do not 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty' [as stated in] Zant, and because they set the stage for capital
punishment which may be 'wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed' [as stated in
Furman].") (citations omitted). For a discussion of Furman, see supra notes 50-54
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Zant, see supra notes 66-69, 84-87 and
accompanying text.
89. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 34, 844(d) and 1716(a) (1988) (providing possibility of
death penalty for perpetrators of mail bombings). For a further discussion of the
statutory provisions, including the specifically relevant sections, see infra note 94
and accompanying text.
90. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 ("When juries are ... allowed to decide who
[among the broad eligible class] deserves death, the possibility of aberrational de-
cisions as to life or death is too great.").
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III. UNITED STATES V CHEELY
A. Facts
In Cheely, the defendant sought retribution against a man named
George Kerr for his prior testimony in a murder trial. 91 Cheely allegedly
mailed a bomb to Kerr with theintent to kill him.92 However, the bomb
killed Kerr's father instead.93 Cheely was subsequently charged under fed-
eral mail-bombing legislation, which made him eligible for a death
sentence.
94
1 91. Id. at 1441. Another defendant, named Gustafson, and two of his relatives
were also charged with the same offense. Id. Gustafson, however, stipulated to the
dismissal of his appeal. Id. at 1441 n.2.
92. Id. at 1441. George Kerr witnessed Gustafson and Cheely kill Jeffrey Cain.
Id. Kerr then testified in the subsequent murder trial that resulted in the convic-
tion of Gustafson and Cheely. Id. Cheely and Gustafson proceeded to plan re-
venge from behind bars, enlisting Gustafson's relatives to mail a bomb to Kerr's
address. Id. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, revenge
is the primary motive of mail bombers. See The Use of Mail to Send Bombs: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Services of the House Comm. on Post Office
and Civil Service, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 18 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing] (testi-
mony of Edmund Kelso, Unit Chief, Bomb Data Center, Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tions). For a further discussion of mail-bombing, see infra notes 157, 162-65 and
accompanying text.
93. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1441. Kerr was out of town and his parents were collect-
ing' his mail for him. Id. When his father opened the package containing the
bomb, it exploded and he was killed. Id. Kerr's mother was also seriously injured.
Id.
Even though Cheely and Gustafson intended to kill Kerr, and not his father,
the crime was still intentional under the doctrine of transferred intent. See Paul H.
Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 615 n.19 (1984) ("[A]n in-
tent to kill deceased may be imputed from the existence and proof of an intent to
kill another." (citing People v. Forrest, 272 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. App. 1971))). The
death penalty is permissible under the proportionality test for intentional killings.
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 155-78 (1987) (holding that major participation
in felony combined with reckless indifference to human life was sufficient to satisfy
culpability requirement). Thus, Cheely and Gustafson had no disproportionality
arguments under Tison. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1443 ("Cheely is not in a position to
advance this argument, however, as he is charged with the intentional murder of
David Kerr."). Judge Alarcon, in his dissent, agreed. See id. at 1449 (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting) ("Cheely is charged with sending an explosive device intentionally
designed to kill the recipient."). For a further discussion of the proportionality
requirement, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
94. Specifically, Cheely was charged under three statutory provisions. Cheely,
36 F.3d at 1443. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (1988), provides in pertinent part,
that:
(d) Whoever transports or receives, or attempts to transport or receive, in
interstate commerce ... any explosive with the knowledge or intent that
it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to
damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property, shall be
imprisoned for not more than ten years, or fined not more than $10,000,
or both; and if ... death results to any person .... shall be subject to
imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life
imprisonment as provided in section 34 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (emphasis added).
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Second, Cheely was also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1988), which generally
provides what penalty is to be given when death results. Section 34 states that:
"Whoever is convicted of any crime prohibited by this chapter, which has resulted
in the death of any person, shall be subject also to the death penalty or to impris-
onment for life, if the jury shall in its discretion so direct." 18 U.S.C. § 34.
Third, Cheely was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (1988), which describes
nonmailable injurious articles. Section 1716(a) provides that:
(a) [A111 explosives . . .are non-mailable matter and shall not be con-
veyed in the mails...
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail [,] . . .anything declared non-mailable by
this section[,] ... with intent to kill or injure another, or injure the mails or
other property, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
Whoever is convicted of any crime prohibited by this section, which
has resulted in the death of any person, shall be subject also to the death
penalty or to imprisonment for life, if the jury shall in its discretion so
direct...
18 U.S.C. § 1716(a), undesignated paragraphs following (i) (1988) (emphasis
added).
All of the applicable statutory sections were enacted prior to the Furman deci-
sion in 1972: Section 34 was added to Title 18 on July 14, 1956, the portion of
§ 1716 authorizing the death penalty was enacted on September 2, 1957 and the
part of § 844 authorizing the death penalty was effective on October 15, 1970. See
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 956.
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 altered these
sections somewhat. See H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter 1994
Crime Bill]. Section 844(d) was amended to no longer make reference to § 34.
Id. Section 1716 no longer authorizes the death penalty. Id. At the same time, the
1994 Crime Bill authorizes the death penalty for many new federal crimes, from
car-jacking to drive-by-shooting. Id.; see also HenryJ. Reske, A Bigger Role for the Feds:
60 Offenses Now Eligible for Death Penalty Under Bil4 80 A.B.A. J. 14 (Oct. 1994) (stat-
ing that bill increases to 60 number of federal crimes that could bring death pen-
alty). For a discussion of the impact Cheely will have on the 1994 Crime Bill, see
infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
Prior to 1988, the Department ofJustice took the official position that federal
death penalty statutes, like the ones above, were unconstitutional because they did
not contain Furman procedures for regulating the imposition of the death penalty.
Kamenar, supra note 35, at 881. In 1988, however, the Department ofJustice modi-
fied its position, stating that
[Tihe death penalty may be permissible for certain crimes in addition to
aircraft hijacking. There are arguments, never considered by the
Supreme Court, that imposition of the death penalty for narrowly drawn
offenses against the United States and its officials remain viable under the
rationale of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Id. at 882-83 n.7 (quoting 3(a) U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, U.S. ATfORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-
10.010 (rev. Oct. 1, 1988)).
At least one authority has taken this position a step further, stating that all
federal death penalty statutes are constitutional on their face because they already
channel the sentencer's discretion "by focusing on the particular criminal and his
[or her] particular crime." Id. at 884-85. This theory, however, does not consider
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Cheely contended that a death sentence would be unconstitutional
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 5 The Constitution,
Cheely argued, prohibits the imposition of arbitrary death sentences. 96
Cheely concluded that, because the federal mail-bombing legislation did
not adequately narrow the class of those eligible for a death sentence, the
legislation was unconstitutionally arbitrary.9 7
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska agreed,
finding the statute unconstitutional.9 " The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision on the basis of the statute's failure to genuinely nar-
row the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.9 9 This failure, the
court reasoned, would result in inconsistent sentencing and set the stage
for arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 1° °
B. The Majority Opinion: Attempting to Limit Arbitrary Capital Sentencing,
According to Furman and its Progeny
The Ninth Circuit found the federal mail-bombing statute unconstitu-
tional because it permitted arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 10 1 The statute pro-
hibits mailing an explosive with the intent to kill or injure a person or
property, or with knowledge that such killing or injury might result.'0 2
Where death results, the defendant is eligible for a death sentence. 10 3
This language, the court reasoned, did not adequately narrow the class of
95. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1442 (arguing that, under Furman and Gregg, standar-
dless jury discretion violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. For a further discussion of the Eighth Amendment, and how it ap-
plies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 3, 32 and
accompanying text.
96. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1442-45 (arguing that capital punishment is unconsti-
tutional when it is wantonly and freakishly imposed).
97. See id. (stating that statute including capital punishment as possible pen-
alty must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
... reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence.").
98. Id. at 1441. The Ninth Circuit granted the defendant an interlocutory
appeal. Id. Whether the defendant would be subject to the death penalty upon
conviction determined procedures that the court would follow in selecting his jury
and assigning him representation. Id.
99. Id. at 1446. For a further discussion of the narrowing requirement, see
supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
100. Id. For a discussion of arbitrary and capricious sentencing, see supra
notes 44, 46-49 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the consis-
tency requirement, see supra notes 6, 47, 50-54, 64-68 and accompanying text.
101. Id. (affirming lower court's disposition of issue because of statute's fail-
ure to meet tests provided by Zant and Furman).
102. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 34, 844(d), 1716(a) (1988) (authorizing death penalty
for perpetrator of mail-bombing). For a further discussion of the statutory provi-
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persons eligible for the death sentence, thereby leaving the decision to the
sentencer's discretion. 1
0 4
In Cheely, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging both
the consistency and individualization requirements of the Eighth Amend-
ment.10 5 The court states that Furman stood for the proposition that a sen-
tencer must not be permitted to exercise unbridled discretion in applying
the death penalty. 10 6 The court determined that the cases since Furman
have developed two specific requirements.' 0 7 First, the cases mandate
that the legislature narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to achieve
consistency in sentencing.10 8 Second, the cases require that the legisla-
ture allow the sentencer to consider and give effect to relevant mitigating
circumstances to achieve individualization in sentencing. 10 9
The Ninth Circuit then evaluated the statute in question against the
consistency requirement.1 0 As an initial matter, the court noted that the
required narrowing of the death eligible class may be accomplished either
at the guilt or sentencing phase."1 In the federal mail-bombing statute,
the court implied, this narrowing function must occur by or at the stage of
sentencing where a defendant's guilt or innocence is determined." 2
The Cheely court found that the statute failed to meet the consistency
requirement because it authorized death for acts less culpable than reck-
less homicide." 13 The statute applies to mail-bombing where, at the least,
104. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1446 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877
(1983)). For a detailed discussion of Zant, see supra notes 64-69, 84-87 and accom-
panying text.
105. Id. at 1442 (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
318 (1989)). For a detailed discussion of Penry, see supra notes 75-77 and accom-
panying text.
106. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (per curiam)
(Stewart, J., concurring)). For a discussion of Furman, see supra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
107. Id. ("The post-Furman death penalty jurisprudential framework can be
quickly sketched."). For a discussion of the evolution of Furman's requirement, see
supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
108. Id. (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 862).
109. Id. (citing Penty, 492 U.S. at 302).
110. Id. at 1443-46. For a more detailed discussion of the consistency require-
ment, see supra notes 6, 47, 50-54, 64-68 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 1442 (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)). For a
discussion of Lowenfield, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
112. See id. at 1444-45 ("[S]ections 844(d) and 1716(d) neither require the
jury to find any of the aggravating factors present in Gregg, nor account for these
factors directly in their definitions of death-eligible conduct .... "); see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 34, 844(d), 1716(a) (1988). For a detailed discussion of the statutory
provisions, including a listing of the specifically relevant sections, see supra note 94
and accompanying text.
113. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 ("[Tlhese sections do not even restrict their
focus to murderers, but rather sweep within their coverage those guilty of no more
than involuntary manslaughter.").
1494 [Vol. 40: p. 1461
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/4
the defendant knowingly or intentionally injured property. 1 4 A defend-
ant found guilty under the statute could receive a death sentence any time
a death resulted from the mail-bombing." 5 As a result, the Cheely court
found that the statute's culpablility threshold violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's proportionality requirement. The Cheely court determined that the
statute would permit death sentences for defendants who acted less than
recklessly with regard to the life of another." 6 For the same reason, the
court decided that the statute also failed to guide the sentencer in distin-
guishing among defendants eligible for death." 7
The court found that even though the statute's application was inher-
ently narrow in scope, it still failed to acceptably restrict the size of the
death-eligible class." 8 Although the statute applied only to an extremely
small class of federal crimes, it did not list specific aggravating circum-
stances for the sentencer to consider." 9 The required narrowing, the
Ninth Circuit stated, necessarily centers around the type of statutory aggra-
vating factors previously upheld by the Supreme Court and lacking from
the mail-bombing legislation. 120
114. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 34, 844(d), 1716(a). For a further discussion of the stat-
utory provisions, including the specifically relevant sections, see supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
115. Cheety, 36 F.3d at 1445.
116. Id. at 1444-46. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in
Tison v. Arizona and Coker v. Georgia. Id. at 1444-46 & nn.17-18 (citing Tison v.
Arizona, 482 U.S. 137, 155-58 (1987); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion)). Prior to Tison, in Coker, the Court held that a death sentence is
disproportionately severe where the defendant rapes an adult woman. Coker, 433
U.S. at 584. Coker implied that the death penalty is permissible on proportionality
grounds when a homicide has occurred. See Menard, supra note 43, at 1126 (stat-
ing that Coker implicitly holds that death is permissable punishment for person
who has committed homicide); cf. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1446 n.18 ("Coker v. Georgia
does not foreclose the possibility that grave injury to the interests of the United
States would suffice.").
In Tison, the Court held that the death penalty is permissible on proportional-
ity grounds for a killing that occurs during commission of a felony only when the
defendant exhibits a culpable mental state of at least reckless disregard for human
life. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58. For a further discussion of the proportionality re-
quirement, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
117. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1444 ("[U]nder the statute one jury could sentence the
football field bombers to death, while another could reject the death penalty in a
case where a paid assassin successfully used a mail-bomb to murder an NAACP
leader.").
118. See id. at 1445 ("Surely, the death penalty cannot be imposed for each
and every intentional act which is susceptible to federal legislative jurisdiction and
which results in a death."). The court did not take into consideration that every
act falling under federal legislative jurisdiction is not as rare and severe in result as
mail-bombing. See id. For a discussion of the inherent danger of mail-bombing,
see infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
119. See id. at 1445-46. For a discussion of the specific statutory provisions,
see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
120. See id. at 1444-45 (discussing Lowenfield, Jurek and Gregg). For a further
discussion of the narrowing requirement, see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying
1995] NOTE 1495
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C. Judge Alarcon's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Alarcon identified several errors in
the majority's analysis.1 2 1 First, Judge Alarcon argued that the majority
incorrectly ignored the presumptive validity of legislative enactments.' 22
According to the Supreme Court, legislatively enacted punishments are
presumed valid, and the burden is on the challenger to overcome this
presumption. 123 The dissenting Judge wrote that the majority failed to
place this "heavy burden" on the defendant.124
Second, Judge Alarcon contended that, because it limited the death
penalty "to those who kill in a particularly appalling and heinous manner,"
the federal mail-bombing legislation complied with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 125 Such a narrow statutory defi-
nition, Judge Alarcon stated, may adequately control the jury's discre-
tion. 126 Further, Judge Alarcon noted that neither Supreme Court nor
Ninth Circuit precedent specifically requires narrowing through statutory
aggravating circumstances.'2 7 InsteadJudge Alarcon determined that the
text. For a further discussion of the role of statutory aggravating circumstances,
see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 1448-59 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (arguing that, as applied to
Cheely, statutes fully complied with Eighth Amendment).
122. Id. at 1448 (Alarcon,J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon stated that the major-
ity "ignored the presumption that 'a punishment selected by a democratically
elected legislature is constitutionality valid.' " Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
123. Id. at 1449-50 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon stated that the
Supreme Court "instruct[ed] us that we must presume that Congress lawfully per-
formed its constitutional duties." Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (relying on Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Judge Alarcon argued that
"[a]lthough never acknowledged by the majority, it is Cheely who bears the heavy
burden of demonstrating that section 844(d) and section 1716(a) are unconstitu-
tional." Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon concluded that, even if the
court had placed this burden on the defendant, Cheely "ha[d] not met that bur-
den." Id. (Alarcon,J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1449 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon stated that the fed-
eral mail-bombing legislation "limited the death penalty to those who kill in a par-
ticularly appalling and heinous manner. As applied to Cheely, these statutes fully
comply with the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the Court." Id. (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting)
126. Id. at 1454 (Alarcon,J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon wrote that "the Court
has held that the narrowing function can be provided in the definition of the
crime applied during the guilt phase of trial, or in the specification of aggravating
circumstances to be considered during sentencing proceedings." Id. (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting). Judge Alarcon relied upon the Supreme Court's approval of death
sentencing procedures lacking statutory aggravating circumstances in both Jurek v.
Texas and Lowenfield v. Phelps. Id. at 1454-57 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 233, 235, 241-42 (1988); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 270 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
127. Id. at 1454-57 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon argued that, in
Jurek, the Court found that a statute may sufficiently channel the jury's discretion
at the guilt phase through making the death penalty a sentencing option for a
1496
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/4
1995] NOTE 1497
federal mail-bombing legislation was constitutional even though it lacked
statutory aggravating circumstances, because its definition was sufficiently
narrow.
12 8
Third, Judge Alarcon concluded that the majority confused the con-
sistency requirement's mandate-that a statute adequately narrow the
class of defendants eligible for a death sentence-with the Eighth Amend-
ment's proportionality requirement.1 29 In the case at hand, the defend-
ants were charged with intentional homicide.' 3 0 Thus, Judge Alarcon
reasoned, they did not have standing to assert a proportionality challenge
to the federal mail-bombing legislation.13 1 Yet, Judge Alarcon opined that
because the majority was unable to proceed past the defendant's potential
smaller class of murderers. Id. at 1452-55 (Alarcon,J., dissenting) (citingJurek, 428
U.S. at 270). Judge Alarcon distinguished United States v. Harper on the grounds
that it did not require a demonstration that someone was injured. Id. at 1457-58
(Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir.
1984)). In Harper, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the federal espionage statute,
which authorized a penalty of death for what seemed to be an inherently narrow
offense. See id. at 1445-46 & n.17 (citing Harper, 729 F.2d at 1218 n.1) (stating that
" '[i]t is difficult to conceive of an offense category more narrow than espio-
nage.' "). Judge Alarcon argues that unlike the statute invalidated in Harper, the
federal mail-bombing legislation does not "lump[ ] together in one statute all
forms of" a crime. Id. at 1457 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing Harper, 729 F.2d at
1218 n.1). Instead, the statute at issue "distinguish[es] the types of [a crime] that
in its judgment required the death penalty from other forms less threatening to
our national defense of public safety." Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon
concluded that "Congress, in its definition of the crime, has confined the jury's
ability to recommend the death penalty to a case wherein the defendant mailed a
bomb with the intent to injure or kill the recipient, and caused the death of a
human being." Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1450 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon stated that "[the
majority's analysis confuses the requirement that statutes narrow the class of per-
sons subject to the death penalty with the rule prohibiting a punishment that is
grossly disproportionate to the crime involved." Id. (Alarcon,J., dissenting) (citing
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Judge Alarcon
concluded that the Coker line of analysis, which focuses on a defendant's level of
culpability, "more properly relates to the question of proportionality, a require-
ment which is fulfilled in this case." Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon stated that Cheely has been
"charged with what would have been identified as an especially vicious form of
deliberate, premeditated, intentional murder at common law." Id. (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
131. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). In dissent, Judge Alarcon stated:
[W]e lack the jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on hypothetical ques-
tions. Our authority is limited to actual cases and controversies presented
by persons who have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation
because of an alleged or threatened injury. The constitutionality of the
portions of these statutes that make an intentional killing punishable by
death is the sole issue before this court.
Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon concluded that "Cheely simply lacks
the standing to challenge these statutes" on proportionality grounds. Id. (Alarcon,
J., dissenting).
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proportionality challenge, they incorrectly evaluated the statute for
arbitrariness. 13 2
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: FAILURE TO CORRECTLY LIMIT ARBITRARINESS
UNDER f IRM4NIAND ITS PROGENY
From the beginning, the Cheely court's arbitrariness analysis was unsat-
isfactory.1 33 Foremost, the court measured the federal mail-bombing leg-
islation against the arbitrariness standard without first considering societal
values and the important role legislative enactments play in their measure-
ment.1 34 The Supreme Court has stated that social acceptance of punish-
ment, although not determinative, must be weighed against excessiveness,
necessariness and arbitrariness.' 3 5 By failing to initially analyze whether
the federal mail-bombing statute is representative of societal norms, the
Ninth Circuit overlooked an integral part of Eighth Amendment
analysis.13 6
132. Id. at 1450 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon argued that the ma-
jority's hypothetical, where a person guilty of involuntary manslaughter could be
sentenced to death under the federal mail-bombing legislation, distracted the
court. Id. (Alarcon,J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 1442. The court began its analysis with a discussion of Furman.
Id. For a discussion of Furman, see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
134. See id. at 1443-46.
135. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion). For a further discussion of the balancing test between social acceptance and
excessiveness, necessariness and arbitrariness when punishing a criminal, see cases
cited supra note 45.
136. See id. at 173. Because Congress enacted the federal mail-bombing legis-
lation, the courts may owe it even greater deference. See Acosta, supra note 2, at
608 ("Many argue that congressional judgment in prescribing criminal penalties
deserves even greater deference than that afforded to state legislatures."). Indeed,
"Congress has significantly more latitude than any individual State in determining
the necessary punishment for federal crimes that affect the security of the Nation
as a whole." Id. This is because an act that has passed Congress, and the Presi-
dent's desk, has essentially been approved by the representatives of American soci-
ety as a whole. Id.
Whether the federal mail-bombing statute actually measures up to societal
norms is a separate question. The Court in Furman found the extremely small
number of defendants actually sentenced to death to represent a societal disap-
proval of the penalty. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1972) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing inference of arbitrariness raised by
death penalty's application); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (stating that "the
[death] penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too atten-
uated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.").
Using the same reasoning, any federal death penalty statute would fare even
worse than the statute at issue in Furman. From the mid-1960's through 1991, the
federal government did not execute a single person. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATIsTICs, supra note 35, at 679. In sum, only 167 persons were executed
during that 26-year period-an average of about six persons per year-and all by
the states. Id. Indeed, "[a]n execution is not a common event in the United
States." See NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 2, at 1.
However, recent statistics indicate two important changes: 1) increasing pop-
ular approval for the death penalty and 2) rising numbers of death sentences im-
1498 [Vol, 40: p. 1461
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A second problem in the court's arbitrariness analysis was its errone-
ous interpretation of the consistency requirement.13 7 To satisfy this re-
quirement, the court concluded that a statute must foreclose the prospect
of ajury deciding who among a broad class of defendants is eligible for the
death penalty.1 38 Furman and its progeny, however, exclusively addressed
wholly arbitrary, excessively discretionary sentencing.13 9 These cases do
not support the foreclosure of sentencer discretion.1 40 Thus, the Cheely
decision violated the Eighth Amendment's consistency requirement, mis-
interpreting Furman and its progeny to permit the foreclosure of sen-
tencer discretion. 14 1
A third deficiency in Cheely was the Ninth Circuit's failure to support
its assertion that the federal mail-bombing legislation had not met the
consistency requirement's narrowing function. 142 Initially, the court cor-
posed by the federal government. Acosta, supra note 2, at 596-608. A 1986 survey
indicated that approximately 70% of Americans favor the death penalty as punish-
ment for murder. Id. at 597 (citing American Survey: Capital Punishment, ECONO-
MIST, Mar. 19, 1988, at 23). Public approval for the death penalty drops when
those polled are given a choice of sentences, but still hovers around 50%. DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (1995) ("Public
support for the death penalty drops to below 50% when voters are offered alterna-
tive sentences.") [hereinafter FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY]. A 1989 poll indi-
cated that 62% of Americans favor capital punishment for drug criminals. Acosta,
supra note 2, at 606 (citing Strasser, One Nation Under Siege, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 1989,
at S2). And now, the federal government is building its first ever death penalty
facility to accomodate the rising number of federal prisoners under sentence of
death. See Montgomery, supra note 35, at C1.
137. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (holding sentencer discretion must not be left
entirely unfettered); Furman, 408 U.S. at 328 (same). For a more detailed discus-
sion of the consistency requirement, see supra notes 6, 47, 50-54, 64-68 and accom-
panying text.
138. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 (reasoning that statute was unconstitutional
because it failed to foreclose prospect of aberrational decision-making).
139. See Sundby, supra note 5, at 1180 ("[I]t is important to remember that
Furman did not condemn discretion in and of itself, but discretion that produced
arbitrary and capricious results."). For a further discussion of the Court's concern
for wholly arbitrary sentencing, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
140. Id. In fact, the Court stated that foreclosure of sentencer discretion
would be unacceptable. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303 (1987) (reason-
ing that some inconsistency is not only acceptable, but required by Woodson).
141. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303-04 (finding discretion important to ensure
"reasoned moral judgment"); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1180 (stating that sentencer
discretion must be carefully constricted to ensure just results). For a discussion of
the consistency requirement, see supra notes 6, 47, 50-54, 64-68 and accompanying
text.
142. The court identified two main problems in Cheely. First, the statute's lim-
ited jurisdiction is not sufficient to perform the required narrowing. See Cheely, 36
F.3d at 1445 n.14 (agreeing with defendant's counsel that to say otherwise would
permit state to " 'save its capital sentencing scheme simply by subdividing the
homicide section of its criminal code to provide, for example, for murder by gun,
murder by knife, by burning' ") (citing Appellee's Brief at 28, United States v.
Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-30257, 92-30504). Second, the nec-
essary culpability requirement was missing. Id. at 1445 n.15.
1995] .NOTE 1499
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rectly identified statutory jurisdiction and culpability as two areas where
Congress' attempt to narrow the death-eligible class could potentially be
undermined. Narrow jurisdiction, standing alone, is not enough to avoid
inconsistent sentencing.143 While limiting the scope of a sentencing
scheme to a small number of defendants could reduce the total number of
death sentences given, inconsistent results could still occur if the
sentencers retained unfettered discretion over the selection of those
sentences.
1 44
Absence of a culpability requirement also could lead to inconsistent
sentences. 145 Courts have found that an examination of culpability is an
appropriate part of the arbitrariness analysis. 146 Further, without clear de-
143. Id. at 1445 n.14. But see Kamenar, supra note 35, at 882 n.7 (stating that
narrowly drawn federal offenses may be viable underJurek (citing 3(a) U.S. DEP'T
oFJUsTIcE, U.S. A-rORNY'S MANUAL § 9-10.010 (rev. Oct. 1, 1988))).
InJurek, the Court held that Texas' action in narrowing capital offenses to
five categories in essence requires the jury to find the existence of a statu-
tory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may be imposed,
thus requiring the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized na-
ture of the crime.
Id.
In Lowenfield v. Phelps, the Court relied on Jurek to conclude that statutory
definitions could accomplish the required narrowing just a few months after the
U.S. Attorney's Manual was revised. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 245-46
(1988). For a further discussion of Lowenfield, see supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
144. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 n.14 (citing Appellee's Brief at 28, United
States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-30257, 92-30504)). If the
sole criteria was the number of defendants likely to come under the legislation,
states could make all their capital punishment statutes constitutional by subdivid-
ing them into categories of murder for each different method that could be em-
ployed. Id. Such an action would make no change in the level of sentencer
discretion. Id.
145. See Howe, supra note 9, at 334 ("If every justification a sentencer might
rely on to impose a death sentence were proper, there would be no reason to
proscribe unfettered sentencer choice.").
146. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) ("A critical facet of the
individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental
state with which the defendant commits the crime."); see also Howe, supra note 9, at
396 & n.290 (discussing culpability consideration in individualization analysis (cit-
ing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
Likewise, individualization factors may arise within an evaluation of excessivity, the
area where culpability is generally the central issue. Id. at 339. "Excessive punish-
ment, at least as regards the death penalty, could be measured not simply against
the definition of the crime committed, but also against the individual characteris-
tics of the offense and the offender." Id.
Considering culpability within the arbitrariness evaluation, however, may not
be appropriate because it creates possible confusion between the excessivity and
arbitrariness lines of Eighth Amendment analysis. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1451 (Alar-
con, J., dissenting) (stating that majority opinion confuses narrowing requirement
with proportionality requirement). For a general discussion of whether the indi-
vidualization requirement mandates a culpability inquiry, or some other inquiry,
see Howe, supra note 9. For a discussion of the excessivity/proportionality require-
ment, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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lineation of which mental states are most culpable, sentencers may be con-
fused about the legislative intent.1 4 7 One sentencer could view a
premeditated killer as most deserving of death, while another sentencer
could view a reckless killer most deserving. 148 Consequently, the lack of a
culpability provision could easily lead to discrepant sentences.
1 49
The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to support its contention that
these issues actually undermined Congress' attempt at narrowing.1 50
Rather, the Cheely court misinterpreted precedent regarding what is re-
quired to narrow the death-eligible class.1 5 1 The Ninth Circuit required
the use of statutory aggravating circumstances, which the Supreme Court
previously examined. 152 It is true that the Supreme Court has upheld sev-
eral sentencing schemes employing lists of aggravating circumstances to
guide sentencer discretion and narrow the class of persons eligible for
death.1 55 The Court made it clear, however, that statutory aggravating fac-
147. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 907 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) ("Without a focus on the characteristics of the defendant and the circum-
stances of his crime, an uninformed jury could be tempted to resort to irrational
considerations, such as class or race animus."). In Gregg, the Court was very con-
cerned with how the careful drafting of sentencing statutes could be used to con-
trol sentencer discretion. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (stating that Furman concerns could be allayed "by a carefully drafted
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information
and guidance"). Indeed, the failure of a statute to adequately control sentencer
discretion could lead directly to constitutional infringements. Id. at 195 n.46. The
Court stated that arbitrary and capricious sentencing can result from statutes with
"standards so vague that they [ ] fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision
patterns of juries." Id.; see also Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1444.
148. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM.J. CRiM. L. 1, 38-53
(1988) (discussing motivating factors behind jury death sentence
recommendations).
149. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1443-44. For example, the court believed that under
the federal mail-bombing legislation, "one jury could sentence the football field
bombers to death, while another could reject the death penalty in a case where a
paid assassin successfully used a mail bomb to murder an NAACP leader." Id.
150. The Ninth Circuit believed the federal mail-bombing statutes fail to ade-
quately narrow the death-eligible class because they authorize death for less than
reckless acts. Id. For a discussion of the role a culpability examination plays in the
proportionality analysis, see supra note 43.
151. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (requiring sentencer to
base determination on at least one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance
when narrowing done at sentencing phase); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 431-
32 (1980) (plurality opinion) (finding that aggravating circumstances are not end
but means of performing constitutionally required narrowing). But see Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990) (determining that mere presence of
aggravating circumstances fulfilled narrowing function).
152. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 ("Whether statutes are state or federal, in nar-
rowing the class of death-eligible defendants, they must focus on the type of aggra-
vating factors described in Lowenfied Jurek, and Gregg, not on mere jurisdictional
prerequisites.").
153. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 862 (upholding statutory scheme where sen-
tencer required to find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before im-
posing death sentence); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976) (plurality
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tors were not required.1 5 4 Aggravating circumstances are just one vehicle
for legislative fulfillment of the Eighth Amendment's consistency
requirement. 155
Indeed, the Court has specifically held that legislatures may narrow
the death-eligible class through narrow drafting of statutory definitions.
1 56
The federal mail-bombing legislation, as drafted by Congress, allows the
death penalty for an extremely limited category of defendants-those
found guilty of homicide through an intentional mail-bombing.' 5 7 In the
opinion) (upholding statutory system where sentencer required to weigh eight
statutory aggravating circumstances against seven mitigating circumstances, with
sentencer finding that former outweighed latter); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
198 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding statutory system where sentencer re-
quired to find, beyond reasonable doubt, at least one out of ten statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances before imposing death sentence). But see Lowenfield v. Phelps,
484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (upholding statutory system where narrow statutory defi-
nition performed required narrowing, such that aggravating circumstances need
not perform any narrowing function); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.- 279, 306
(1987) (upholding statutory system where narrow statutory definition performed
required narrowing).
154. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1993) (finding state supreme
court's limiting construction given to aggravating circumstance sufficiently narrow
to defeat vagueness of aggravating circumstance in statute). The Arave Court im-
plicitly based its entire analysis upon the assumption that aggravating circum-
stances are not a constitutional end, but are rather a means of accomplishing the
requisite narrowing. Id. Otherwise, the Court would have had no need to ex-
amine the aggravating circumstance for vagueness amounting to a failure to meet
the narrowing requirement. See id.; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 420 (basing analysis of
similar statute upon similar considerations).
155. See, e.g., Arave, 507 U.S. at 475-76; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 420; see also Clarke,
supra note 2, at 419 n.60 ("It is impossible to predict with any assurance just what
state capital sentencing procedures the Court will approve or disapprove.").
156. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 231 (holding that required narrowing was per-
formed by statutory definition); McClskey, 481 U.S. at 306 (same).
157. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (Alarcon,
J., dissenting) ("Congress limited the death penalty to those who kill in a particu-
larly appalling and heinous manner."). Judge Alarcon contended that this narrow
statutory definition met the Eighth Amendment requirements, stating that the stat-
utory definition authorized death for a smaller class of defendants, as required by
the Supreme Court. Id. at 1456-57 (Alarcon,J., dissenting). For the relevant provi-
sions of the federal mail-bombing legislations, see supra note 94.
The U.S. Postal Service agrees that mail-bombing is a "relatively rare crime."
See BOMB SUMMARY, supra note 72, at 42. In 1993, the Postal Service reported 21
incidents of actual mail-bombing. See Hearing, supra note 92, at 14 (testimony of
Edmund Kelso, Unit Chief, Bomb Data Center, Fed. Bureau of Investigations). In
the same year, the Postal Service handled 171 billion pieces of mail. Id. at 3. In
fact, over the last 10 years, the Postal Service reported that an average of only 15
bombs per year have been discovered in the mail. Id. In sum, mail-bombings ac-
count for about one percent of all the bombings in the U.S. Id. at 18.
At the same time, the Postal Service considers mail-bombing a "horrifying and
deadly" crime. See BOMB SUMMARY, supra note 72, at 42. As a result of the 21
bombs actually mailed in 1993, five persons were killed and 16 injured. Hearing,
supra note 92, at 14 (testimony of Edmund Kelso, Unit Chief, Bomb Data Center,
Fed. Bureau of Investigations). Even though it rarely occurs, mail-bombing
"strike [s] at the very heart of a free society, promoting fear and anxiety among the
1502
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case of a narrow statutory definition, statutory aggravating circumstances
may merely repeat a requirement contained within the statutory defini-
tion. 15 8 Thus, where a statutory definition is adequately narrow, no aggra-
vating circumstances are required to achieve additional narrowing. 159
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's contention that the mail-bombing stat-
ute actually lacks the scienter requirement is debatable.1 60 Superficially,
the statute appears to authorize a death sentence for defendants who act
merely negligently.1 6 1 Mailing a bomb, however, is an activity that inher-
ently poses grave risks to others. 162 By their nature, bombs are ready to
explode at any minute. 163 An exploding bomb (detonated by intention or
malfunction) exposes innumerable postal workers and innocent people to
grave harm in areas near post offices, mail boxes and the city streets where
mail trucks drive.1 64 For these reasons, a person who mails a bomb must
act, at the least, with reckless disregard for the lives of others.1 65
nation's citizens." Id. at 18. For a further discussion of mail-bombing, see infra
notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
158. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 243-44 (stating that statutory aggravating
cicumstance merely repeated part of murder definition); see also Howe, supra note
9, at 401 (stating that sentencer would not be guided at sentencing phase when
aggravating circumstance already found at guilt determination phase).
159. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241-44 (upholding sentencing scheme where
aggravating circumstances existed but did not perform necessary narrowing); Mc-
Cleskey, 481 U.S. at 306 (upholding sentencing scheme where narrow statutory defi-
nition performed necessary narrowing); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (upholding sentencing scheme where no necessary narrowing
was performed, in absence of statutory aggravating circumstances). For a further
discussion of the role of statutory aggravating circumstances, see supra notes 66-74
and accompanying text.
160. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 34, 844(d), 1716(a) (1988). For a further discussion of
these statutory provisions, including the specifically relevant sections, see supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
161. See id. For a discussion of the specifically relevant sections, see supra note
94 and accompanying text.
162. Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts'recklessly when he or she "con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(c) (1962). This risk "must be of such a nature and degree that, consider-
ing the nature and purposes of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Id.
163. As a result, all postal inspectors receive "basic mail bomb investigations
training" and about 20% of the postal workforce receives more advance training in
"mail bomb investigative techniques." Hearing, supra note 92, at 3 (testimony of
Michael Hearst, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Service). Further, the
Inspection Service of the United States government maintains crime laboratories
with mail bomb forensic experts, where inspectors and forensic experts are "on
call 24 hours a day." Id. at 4.
164. See BOMB SUMMARY, supra note 72, at 42 (stating that over 800,000 postal
employees handle mail each day).
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Thus, this state of mental culpability could be a valid reason for sentencing a de-
fendant to death. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) ("[R]eckless indif-
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Further, it is unclear whether a federal mail-bombing law that lacks a
culpability requirement would necessarily lead to unconstitutional capital
sentencing. 166 The judicial system often calls upon juries and judges to
distinguish between intentional, reckless and negligent acts.1 67 In this in-
stance, the absence of a culpability requirement similarly gives ajury some
freedom to determine a crime's severity on a case-by-case basis.168 In cer-
tain circumstances, a sentencer may reasonably consider an intentional
and somewhat justified act to be less deserving of the death penalty than a
grossly negligent or reckless-but unjustified-act.1 6 9 Thus, any "discrep-
ancy" observable in the sentencing system might be entirely rational.
170
ference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense
as an 'intent to kill.' "). The Tison Court stated that:
[W]e hold that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in know-
ingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death
represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be
taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that
conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result.
Id. at 157-58. For a further discussion of Tison, see supra note 43.
166. See Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. LJ. 375, 377-78
(1994) (noting that focus on aggravating/mitigating circumstances in death pen-
alty procedures has superseded importance of culpability requirements and of de-
fendant's state of mind and has, thereby, resulted in "marginally" reducing
arbitrariness in death sentencing); see also Howe, supra note 9, at 356 (noting that
"[a]ssessments of culpability alone do not capture some significant bases for dis-
tinction among the deserts of capital offenders").
167. See Givelber, supra note 166, at 380. Traditionally, juries have to choose
between different degrees of murder, each identified by a different state of mental
culpability. Id.
168. Id. Legislatures had this in mind when they originally chose to grant
discretion to juries in capital cases. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
291, 292-93 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Woodson, the Court noted that "[t]he
inadequacy of distinguishing between murderers solely on the basis of legislative
criteria narrowing the definition of the capital offense led the States to grant juries
sentencing discretion in capital cases." Id. at 291.
169. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291 (discussing juries
refusing to impose death penalties in certain situations). The Tison Court stated:
[I]ntentional homicides, though criminal, are often held undeserving of
the death penalty-those that are the result of provocation. On the
other hand, some nonintentional murderers may be among the most
dangerous and inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not
caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone
in the course of a robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to
rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as
taking the victim's property.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 157; see also Acosta, supra note 2, at 608 (noting that "the Court
[in Tison] acknowledged that reckless indifference to human life may be as morally
culpable as murder").
170. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157 (noting that common law as well as criminal
codes classify behavior of type discussed in Tison-reckless indifference to human
life-with intentional murder). Ultimately, those who exhibit reckless indiffer-
ence to human life may shock "the moral sense" just as much as those who inten-
tionally kill. Id.
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A fourth inadequacy of the court's analysis in Cheely was its failure to
consider the principles of individualized sentencing.171 In its application
of the consistency requirement, the Ninth Circuit did not address the indi-
vidualization requirement as developed by Woodson and its progeny.
1 72
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly identified the two Eighth Amend-
ment arbitrariness requirements,1 7 3 it only considered the consistency re-
quirement.1 74 In so doing, the court followed the Zant decision, where
the Supreme Court relegated application of the two Eighth Amendment
requirements to separate stages of sentencing.1 75 Thus, rather than pro-
viding legislative guidance for balancing the two requirements simultane-
ously, the Cheely court followed the Supreme Court's lead, directing
separate fulfillment of the components of arbitrariness under the Eighth
Amendment.1 76
Ultimately, because the Ninth Circuit failed to accurately interpret
the consistency requirement,1 77 it allowed arbitrariness to enter the sen-
171. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1442-46 (9th Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussing constitutional requirements for death penalty statutes and applying them
to mail-bombing statutes at issue). The Ninth Circuit identified the individualiza-
tion requirement and noted that the statute must not prohibit consideration of
background or character evidence of defendant and/or mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 1442. However, the court neither applied this requirement nor took into
consideration its underlying principles. See id. (discussing narrowing requirements
and problems with consistency but failing to discuss individualization). For a fur-
ther discussion of the underlying principles of the individualization requirement,
see supra notes 5, 7, 48, 55-59, 75-77 and accompanying text.
172. See Cheely, 3 F.3d at 1442-46 (discussing and applying constitutional re-
quirements for death penalty statutes). The court did not apply the constitutional
mandate of allowing sentencer discretion through consideration of mitigating fac-
tors, or any of the other components of individualized consideration, to the statute
at issue. See id.
173. Id. at 1442. The court noted that a death penalty statute must (1) nar-
row the class of people who are eligible for a death sentence and (2) not prevent
consideration of evidence relevant to character or background of the defendant
and/or mitigating circumstances. Id. For a further discussion of the two Eighth
Amendment requirements, see supra notes 5-8, 46-59 and accompanying text.
174. See id. at 1442-46 (applying consistency requirement to statute at issue).
175. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879-80 (1983). Lower courts have, with-
out better guidance, followed the lead of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Staley v.
Texas, 887 S.W.2d 885, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Baird, J., concurring) (listing
cases), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1366 (1995). For a further discussion of Zant, see
supra note 64, 66-69, 84-87 and accompanying text.
176. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1446 (citing to Zant decision and noting that statu-
tory provisions are unconstitutional because they did not sufficiently narrow death-
eligible class of persons).
177. See id. at 1442-46; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (finding that sentencer discretion must not be left entirely un-
fettered); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1972) (per curiam) (same).
The Ninth Circuit interpreted Furman and Gregg to permit total limitation of sen-
tencer discretion. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1442. For a more detailed discussion of
consistency requirement, see supra notes 6, 47, 49-54, 66-69 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's inadequate interpretation of
the consistency requirement, see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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tencing determination through the "back door" left open when it failed to
consider the principles of individualization. 178 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit intensified the contradiction between the Supreme Court's two ar-
bitrariness requirements, 179 effectively mandating complete limitation of
sentencer discretion.' 8 0 In affirming this mandate, Cheely violated Furman
178. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 912 (1994) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Thomas argued that, in allowing juries to give full weight to mitigat-
ing circumstances of defendant's character and background, the Court permits
juries to make "moral" verdicts, thereby "throw[ing] open the back door to arbi-
trary and irrational sentencing." Id.
Justice Blackmun voiced a similar concern in Callins v. Collins. 114 S. Ct. 1127,
1128-30 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his dissent to the denial of
certiorari, Justice Blackmun stated that:
[T]he problems that were pursued down one hole with procedural rules
and verbal formulas have come to the surface somewhere else, just as
virulent and pernicious as they were in their original form. Experience
has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and
discrimination from the administration of death ... can never be achieved
without compromising an equally essential component of fundamental
fairness-individualized sentencing.
Id. at 1129 (Blackmun,J., dissenting to denial of certiorari) (emphasis added) (ci-
tation omitted). Other commentators also observe the paradox, noted by Justices
Blackmun and Thomas, that expanding or limiting one constitutional require-
ment creates other constitutional problems. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 5, at 1174
("[A]Ilowing the elimination or severe curtailment of sentencer discretion would
simply be to chase the principle of individualized consideration down one hole
and watch it later come up another."). For a further discussion of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's failure to consider the principles of individualization, see supra notes 171-76
and accompanying text.
179. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting to denial of certio-
rari); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Gra-
ham 113 S. Ct. at 912 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting problems with
arbitrariness). Prior to Zant v. Stephens and Penry v. Lynaugh the Court's two re-
quirements were potentially contradictory, but there was the possibility that they
could be applied simultaneously if the correct balance was struck. See Clarke, supra
note 2, at 424-25 (discussing Court-approved "guided discretion" statutes); Mann,
supra note 5, at 495 n.6 (noting that Court accepts statutes that have an effect
somewhere between allowing "excessive discretion" and "insufficient discretion");
Sundby, supra note 5, at 1153 (discussing "the basic Eighth Amendment parame-
ters" for death penalty cases). For a further discussion of the opinions of Justices
Blackmun, Thomas and Scalia, see supra note 81-82 and accompanying text.
180. Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445-46 (reasoning that statute was unconstitutional
because it failed to foreclose prospect of aberrational decision-making). Cheely's
endorsement of a complete limitation of sentencer discretion intensifies the con-
flict between the two requirements. Id. at 1444. At the same time, Cheely's en-
dorsement frustrates the individualization requirement's mandate that sentencer
discretion be completely unrestricted. See id. at 1444-46; see also Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989) (holding that sentencer discretion could not be re-
stricted from considering and giving effect to relevant mitigating evidence). For a
further discussion of the individualization requirement, see supra notes 5, 7, 48,
55-59, 75-77 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Ninth Cir-
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and its progeny.18 1 Moreover, because the Cheely court required any re-
striction of sentencer discretion, it violated the Woodson line of jurispru-
dence.18 2 Thus, even if the Ninth Circuit's determination complied with
the consistency, requirement, the court's flawed decision still allowed arbi-
trariness to sneak in through individualization's open "back door."
18 3
V. IMPACTS OF CHEELY
Cheely will have lasting effects upon Eighth Amendment interpreta-
tion. First, proportionality considerations played an important role in the
court's analysis.' 8 4 The court used an examination of culpability, ordina-
rily part of a proportionality analysis, 185 in its consistency analysis.' 8 6 The
court's use of this approach enlarges the importance of the proportional-
ity analysis itself.' 87
Second, the Eighth Amendment consistency analysis in Cheely will in-
crease the importance of including aggravating circumstances in statutes.
181. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1444-45; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (stating that sentencer discretion should not be left unfet-
tered); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (same). For a discus-
sion of Furman and Gregg's mandate that sentencer discretion not be left
unfettered, see supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how
the Ninth Circuit surpassed this mandate, see supra notes 137-41 and accompany-
ing text.
182. See Chedy, 36 F.3d at 1444-45 (reasoning that sentencer discretion must
be limited); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) ("[Vlirtually no
limits are placed on [the introduction of a capital defendant's] relevant mitigating
evidence ."); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(requiring individualized consideration in sentencing); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same). For a more detailed discus-
sion of Woodson and Roberts, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
183. See Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 912 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the
"back door" of arbitrary sentencing). For a further discussion of the "back door"
of arbitrary sentencing, see supra note 178 and accompanying text.
184. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1443 nn.9-10 (stating that lack of appropriate culpa-
bility requirement causes statute to fail arbitrariness test and would cause statute to
fail proportionality test, if Cheely had acted less than recklessly).
185. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stat-
ing that punishment must match severity of offense committed); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910) (stating that punishment should be propor-
tional to offense). For a detailed discussion of the role that an examination of the
defendant's culpability plays in the proportionality analysis, see supra note 43.
186. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1443-45. Culpability assessment, central to propor-
tionality determination, would also become a part of the arbitrariness determina-
tion. See id. at 1443-45 (stating that statute was unconstitutional because, when
juries faced diverse class of people with different levels of culpability, determina-
tion of appropriateness of capital punishment might be too "aberrational"). For a
discussion of the proportionality/excessivity requirement, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the arbitrariness requirements, see supra
notes 44, 46-49 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the role of culpability
in the Cheely decision, see supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Marr, supra note 35 (providing detailed discussion of aggra-
vating circumstances in statutory systems).
1995] NOTE 1507
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These circumstances can serve as a tool for narrowing the death-eligible
class of defendants. 188 Indeed, legislatures already use statutorily listed ag-
gravating circumstances, seeking assurance that the statutes they enact will
pass constitutional muster. 189 Cheely further underscores the importance
of providing these statutory aggravating circumstances. 190 Legislatures,
faced with the Supreme Court's failure to provide a clear and consistent
constitutional model, will take heed. 19 1
Third, the Cheely holding fails to eradicate confusion in the area of
Eighth Amendment enforcement. 192 The Supreme Court's original pur-
188. The Cheely decision requires the use of statutory aggravating circum-
stances. 36 F.3d at 1446. For a further discussion of statutory aggravating circum-
stances' role, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of aggravating circumstances prior to Cheely, see supra
note 71.
189. See Marr, supra note 35, at 99 ("[M] ore and more states with death pen-
alty statutes are adopting statutory aggravating factors containing the same lan-
guage. States have found that by adopting the specific language set forth in the
Court's opinions, their statutes will be constitutionally satisfactory.").
The Court's prior acceptance does not, however, mean that a statute will be
exempt from future scrutiny. For example, the judiciary has rescrutinized Texas'
sentencing procedure several times in the years after the Supreme Court first de-
clared the statute unconstitutionally arbitrary in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238
(1972). In response to Furman, the Texas legislature revised its sentencing
scheme. Staley v. Texas, 887 S.W. 2d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1366 (1995). The Court approved the new scheme inJurek v. Texas. 428 U.S.
262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion). Thirteen years later, however, the Court
struck down the scheme again in Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). Five
years later, a Texas court once again upheld the state's scheme on Eighth Amend-
ment grounds. See Staley v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1366 (1995) (mem.).
190. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 (stating that statute must narrow death-eligible
class by focusing on "the type of aggravating factors described in Lowenfield, Jurek,
and Greg'). The court reasoned that the federal mail-bombing statute, because it
covers crimes less severe than murder, does not contain the equivalent of an aggra-
vating circumstance in its definition. Id. ("Again, these sections [of the federal
mail-bombing legislation] are nothing like the capital sentencing provisions up-
held in Jurek and Lowenfield."). For a further discussion of Jurek, see supra notes 73,
143 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Lowenfield, see supra note
71 and accompanying text.
191. See Marr, supra note 35, at 99 (noting that, as result of Court's holdings,
increasing number of states with capital punishment statutes are adding statutory
aggravating factors containing same language as that used by Court).
192. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning arbitrariness is notori-
ously confusing. See State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1974) ("To say that
Furman has created a (expletive deleted) quandary for state legislatures and courts
is to put it mildly."). Indeed, the confusion surrounding the Court's decision in
Furman has been called a "morass." Id. at 468 (asking Supreme Court to lead other
courts "out of this morass"). Eighth Amendment scholars agree that the area of
law lacks coherency. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 416 ("[T~his curious and dis-
turbing excursion through death penalty case law reveals no consistent or coher-
ent doctrine at all."); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1159 (stating that Lockett Court
attempted not to sow "further confusion in an already confused area of the law").
For a further discussion of the Furman decision, see supra notes 50-54 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of the Lockett decision, see supra notes 75, 76
and 79. For a further discussion of confusion in Eighth Amendment jurispru-
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pose in Furman was to protect capital defendants from arbitrary death sen-
tencing of the kind Henry Porter vehemendy criticized in his final
statement. 193 To further this goal, the Court established the consistency
and individualization requirements.1 9 4 As they have been developed, how-
ever, these two requirements cannot be applied simultaneously to a sen-
tencing stage-even though they are integrally related because they arise
from the same Eighth Amendment mandate.' 95 As a result, courts have
no choice but to follow Zant and, like the Ninth Circuit, focus upon one
requirement or the other when evaluating a sentencing scheme. 196 Yet,
when courts are forced to concentrate on only one of the requirements at
dence concerning arbitrariness, see supra notes 60-63, 78-83, 177-83 and accompa-
nying text.
193. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-72 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing
harm inflicted when excessive punishment is handed down). For a detailed discus-
sion of Furman, see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. For Mr. Porter's last
words, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion) ("Louisiana's mandatory death sentence statute also fails to comply with
Furman's requirement that standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures
that safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death
sentences."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[T]here is no way under the North Carolina law for the judiciary to check
arbitrary and capricious exercise of [a sentencer's] power through a review of
death sentences."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("Furman held that [the death penalty] could not be im-
posed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."); Furman, 408 U.S. at 448 (Powell,
J., dissenting) (characterizing Justice Douglas' concurrence as stating that Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposition of "arbitrary or discriminatory"
punishments). For a detailed discussion of the consistency requirement, see supra
notes 6, 47, 49-54, 66-69 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the
individualization requirement, see supra notes 5, 7, 48, 55-59, 75-77 and accompa-
nying text.
195. SeeCallins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129-38 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting to denial of certiorari) (stating Supreme Court's two Eighth Amend-
ment arbitrariness requirements probably cannot be applied simultaneously); Gra-
ham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 912-14 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that Court's individualized consideration requirement as stated in Penry necessarily
leads to arbitrary sentencing); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that conflict between two Eighth Amendment
requirements "cannot be reconciled."); cf Clarke, supra note 2, at 424-25 (recog-
nizing inherent inconsistency between two requirements); Mann, supra note 5, at
495 n.6 (identifying same conflict and Court's approval of statutes that fall in be-
tween two extremes); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1153 (noting that "guided discre-
tion" statutes met Court's approval and concluding that sentencer discretion must
be "sufficient" yet "controlled").
196. See Staley v. Texas, 887 S.W.2d 885, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Baird,
J., concurring) (stating that lower courts must, when faced with inconsistent
Supreme Court rulings, follow Court's most recent decision and look for further
direction in future), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1366 (1995). For a discussion of Zant's
requirements, see supra notes 66-70, 84-87 and accompanying text.
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a time, they cannot prevent arbitrariness from entering into capital sen-
tencing through the "back door."197
197. See Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 912 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
stated:
When our review of death penalty procedures turns on whether jurors
can give "full mitigating effect" to defendant's background and character
... and on whether juries are free to disregard the state's chosen sentenc-
ing criteria and return a verdict that a majority of this Court will label
"moral," we have thrown open the back door to arbitrary and irrational
sentencing.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Calins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129
(Blackmun, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari) ("[T]he problems that were pur-
sued down one hole with procedural rules . . . have come to the surface some-
where else .... ").
The reality that arbitrariness can enter into death penalty sentencing may
have implications on the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole. See id. at
1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "no combination of procedural rules
or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent consti-
tutional deficiencies"). Justice Blackmun stated:
[O]ver the past two decades, efforts to balance these competing constitu-
tional commands have been to no avail. Experience has shown that the
consistency and rationality promised in Furman are inversely related to
the fairness owed the individual when considering a sentence of death. A
step toward consistency is a step away from fairness.
Id. at 1132 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun relied upon the Court's failure to reconcile the Eighth
Amendment requirements in his conclusion that the death penalty was, after all,
unconstitutional. Id. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justice stated: "Be-
cause I no longer can state with any confidence that this Court is able to reconcile
the Eighth Amendment's competing constitutional commands . . . I believe that
the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitutional." Id. (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun went on to state that "[t]he death penalty must
be imposed 'fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.' " Id. at 1129
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982)). Justice Blackmun considered the Court's attempts at coherency in the
area of capital punishment jurisprudence to be a "failed experiment." Id. at 1130
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He stated: "Rather than continue to coddle the
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need
for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to con-
cede that the death penalty experiment has failed." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Further, Justice Blackmun remained convinced that the other Justices would join
him and abandon their "experiment." Id. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[T]his Court eventually will conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness
while preserving fairness 'in the infliction of [death] is so plainly doomed to fail-
ure that it-and the death penalty-must be abandoned altogether.' " (alteration
in original) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
One commentator likewise concludes, "if the two principles [of consistency
and individualization] are of equal constitutional magnitude and truly cannot be
reconciled, then the death penalty itself must be unconstitutional." See Sundby,
supra note 5, at 1174. Accordingly, "[t] he death penalty would be invalid not be-
cause it is per se cruel and unusual, but because it cannot be procedurally imple-
mented in a constitutional fashion." Id.
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Additionally, the Cheely decision affects the judiciary's constitutionally
defined role with respect to the legislature. 198 In the past, courts have
"explained" what legislatures must do to avoid arbitrary death sentencing
only on a case-by-case basis. 199 Although the courts have sometimes en-
couraged legislatures to exeicise more power, the courts have never stated
clearly how legislatures may constitutionally exercise this power. 200 As a
result, the courts have taken an implicitly activist role in death sentencing
regulation.2 0 '
The Cheely court followed the Supreme Court's separate treatment of
the individualization and consistency requirements, thereby providing no
new legislative means for meeting both arbitrariness tests simultane-
ously.20 2 After Cheely, therefore, the courts will continue to adopt an ac-
198. See generally Posner, supra note 51 (discussing role of courts with respect
to other branches of government).
199. See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990) ("The fact
that other States have enacted different forms of death penalty statutes which also
satisfy constitutional requirements casts no doubt on Pennsylvania's choice.");
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.) ("[E]ach distinct system must be examined on an individual basis.");
see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.,
Stewart, Powell & Stevens, B.) ("There is no perfect procedure for deciding in
which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death.").
200. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 425 (stating that Court has not defined ex-
actly what "guided discretion" requires or entails). For a further discussion of the
Court's failure to provide a clear rule, see supra notes 60-63, 78-83, 177-83, 192-97
and accompanying text.
201. See Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 909 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("By discovering
these two requirements in the Constitution, and by ensuring ... that they would
always be in play, the Court has put itself in the seemingly permanent business of
supervising capital sentencing procedures."); Godfrey v. United States, 446 U.S.
420, 443 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("More troubling
than the plurality's characterization of petitioner's crime is the new responsibility
that it assumes with today's decision-the task of determining on a case-by-case
basis whether a defendant's conduct is egregious enough to warrant a death
sentence.").
Courts do not explicitly state that they are taking an activist role; instead, the
observer must make this deduction. See Posner, supra note 51, at 18 ("Activists are
ashamed to admit in public what they are about; they make you read between the
lines."). For a discussion of the benefits of judicial restraint, see generally Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INn. LJ. 1 (1971),
and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of theJudiciary with Respect to the Other Branches of
Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455, 463-69 (1977). For a thorough discussion of how
the Court has usurped the power of the States to enact death penalty statutes, see
RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 77-152
(1982). For a discussion of the role Furman v. Georgia played as an activist decision,
see supra note 51.
202. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1443-45 (9th Cir. 1994) (con-
sidering the two requirements separately); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
878-79 (1983) (approving structure of Georgia statute with its separate treatment
of two requirements, in different stages of sentencing process). For a further dis-
cussion of Cheely's separate treatment of the two requirements, see supra notes 171-
76 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of Zant and its requirements,
see supra notes 66-69, 84-87 and accompanying text.
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tivist position in regulating death penalty administration. 2 5  Until the
courts provide the legislatures with the means of self-regulation, the courts
will continue to be the true regulators of Eighth Amendment
compliance.2 0 4
Cheely influences the balance of power between the legislative and ju-
dicial branches in another significant way.20 5 Legislative enactments are
traditionally viewed as presumptively valid interpretations of public senti-
ment toward capital punishment. 20 6 Because the Cheely court ignored any
need to rebut this presumption, it implicitly asserted itself as the primary
expositor of what society thinks is appropriate punishment.2 0 7 Thus,
Cheely expands the judiciary's power in this realm. 20 8
Finally, Cheely has implications for the future enforceability of the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.209 This legislation
authorizes the death penalty for a large number of federal crimes.2 10
Thus, like the mail-bombing legislation, the Crime Act may be vulnerable
to constitutional attack under Cheely for its failure to adequately narrow
203. See Hintze, supra note 2, at 416 ("IT he current system ... requires con-
stantjudicial oversight and the active involvement of the judiciary if it is to operate
correctly.") (footnote omitted).
204. See id. at 416 (noting that Court's decisions have made judicial oversight
necessary part of capital punishment system).
205. See generally Johnson, supra note 201; Posner, supra note 51 (discussing
role of courts with respect to other branches of government).
206. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(stating that Court refrained from invalidating statute out of "[c]onsiderations of
federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of
its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its so-
cial utility as a sanction."); see also Acosta, supra note 2, at 608 (recognizing that
federal legislation concerning criminal punishments may be owed even greater
deference by courts because it was enacted by the entire nations' chosen represent-
atives) (citation omitted). But cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (per
curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Legislative authorization, of course, does not
establish acceptance.").
207. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1443-46 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Hintze, supra note 2, at 416 (noting that Supreme Court effectively mandated ac-
tive judicial involvement in capital punishment area).
208. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion) (stating that legislative enactments and jury determinations are two main in-
dicators of socially acceptable punishments). Traditionally, legislative enactments
serve as a primary forecaster of social acceptance. Id. at 294-95 (citing Gregg, 428
U.S. at 179-81 (plurality opinion)). If the judiciary takes over the role of determin-
ing social acceptance, the judiciary usurps the legislative branch's power and,
therefore, acts in an activist manner. See Posner, supra note 51, at 13 (discussing
how court acts in activist manner and noting that federal courts "seem to be get-
ting away with a big power grab from the political branches"), For a more detailed
discussion of the role of legislatures and juries, see supra notes 39-45 and accompa-
nying text.
209. See H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1994). For a further discussion of
the 1994 Crime Bill, see supra note 94.
210. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1994)).
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the class of death-eligible defendants.2 1 1 Even though Congress had the
foresight to include statutory aggravating circumstances,2 1 2 the statute is
vulnerable because it does not foreclose sentencer discretion. 213 Conse-
quently, the courts may be flooded with defendants attempting to chal-
lenge their death sentences on Cheely grounds.2 1 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In the United States today, many consider rampant crime to be a "se-
rious social ill."2 15 In search of a quick solution, Congress and the state
legislatures frequently turn to capital punishment.2 1 6 The result:
thousands of death row prisoners currently await execution. 2 17 However,
"our urgent need to curb the problem of crime does not justify our aban-
donment of the Constitution."2 18 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against the arbitrary sentencing of capital defendants must
still be respected.2 1 9
211. See id. (describing but failing to narrow class of death eligible defend-
ants); Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 (recognizing that statute must narrow class of death-
eligible defendants not merely with jurisdictional prerequisites but with aggravat-
ing factors as presented in Lowenfield, Jurek and Gregg). For a further discussion of
the narrowing requirement, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the role of statutory aggravating circumstances, see supra
notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, § 60002, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959 (1994) (to be codified in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3592(b)-(d)) (listing 3 specific aggravating circumstances for death to be im-
posed for crimes of espionage and treason, 15 for homicide and 8 for drug of-
fenses). For a further discussion of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, see supra note 94.
213. See Cheely, 36 F.3d at 1445 (finding statute unconstitutional for failure to
"foreclose" prospect of aberrational decision-making). For a further discussion of
Cheely's attempt to foreclose sentencer discretion, see supra notes 104, 113-20 and
accompanying text.
214. See Reske, supra note 94, at 14 ("The [1994 federal crime] legislation is
certain to increase the workload of the federal judiciary, which already has com-
plained of the crushing volume of criminal cases.").
215. Brennan, supra note 38, at 8. Justice Brennan stated that "rampant
crime is a serious social ill, and that murderers deserve to be punished. The death
penalty may be a reaction to the problem of crime in a particular sense, a 'sym-
bolic palliative for the fear of crime.' " Id. (quoting ArthurJ. Goldberg & Alan M.
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1774
(1970)).
216. Id. at 2. For a discussion of the increasing number of states that have
capital punishment statutes, see supra note 33. For a discussion of the growth of
federal capital punishment, see supra note 35.
217. FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY supra note 136, at 2. As of October,
1994, United States death rows housed 2,948 prisoners. Id. Since 1972, the
number of persons on death row has risen steadily and dramatically. Id. at 3.
218. Brennan, supra note 38, at 9.
219. See id. at 4-9 (noting that Eighth Amendment's Constitutional require-
ments must be followed). Justice Brennan concluded that the language of the
Eighth Amendment, although arguably vague, was determinative. Id. at 8.
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In United States v. Cheely, the Ninth Circuit attempted to respect this
prohibition and guard against arbitrary death sentencing by controlling
sentencer discretion.22 0 The Ninth Circuit, however, made several impor-
tant errors in its interpretation of Eighth Amendment precedent.22 1 First,
the Ninth Circuit ignored precedent mandating analysis of whether the
federal mail-bombing statute coincides with contemporary societal val-
ues.22 2 Second, the court improperly required statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances. 22 3 Third, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the consistency
requirement to permit complete restriction of sentencer discretion, 224
and then failed to adequately explain how the statute failed to meet the
consistency requirement. 225 Finally, the Cheely court completely disre-
garded precedent outlining the principle of individualized consideration
and its mandate that sentencer discretion should not be limited.2 2 6
In this way, the Ninth Circuit failed to give due respect to the Eighth
Amendment.2 2 7 Although to date the Supreme Court has provided only
contradictory Eighth Amendment arbitrariness requirements, the Ninth
Circuit could have guided legislatures in forging a new, middle ground of
220. See United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1443-46 (9th Cir. 1994). For a
further discussion of Cheely's focus on sentencer discretion, see supra notes 88-90,
101-04, 113-17 and accompanying text.
221. For this Casenote's critical analysis of the Cheely decision, see supra notes
133-83 and accompanying text.
222. For a further discussion of the traditional role contemporary societal val-
ues play in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see supra notes 37-39, 133-36, 205-
08 and accompanying text. The Court stated that societal acceptance of a punish-
ment creates a presumption of constitutionality. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-
01 (1958). Legislative enactments are one of the primary determinants of societal
acceptance. Id.; see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294-95 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (plurality
opinion)). For a further discussion of the Trop decision, see supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Woodson decision, see supra
notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
223. For a further discussion of the role statutory aggravating circumstances
lay in fulfilling the Supreme Court's arbitrariness requirements, see supra notes
0-74, 152-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the consistency require-
ment, see supra notes 6, 47, 50-54, 64-69 and accompanying text. For a listing of
the Model Penal Code's aggravating circumstances, see supra note 72.
224. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's incorrect interpretation of
the Supreme Court's consistency requirement, see supra notes 137-41 and accom-
panying text.
225. For a further discussion of how the Ninth Circuit fails to adequately ex-
plain how the federal mail-bombing legislation does not meet the Supreme
Court's consistency requirement, see supra notes 150-70 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of post-1972 cases concerning the consistency requirement and a
discussion of the mandate that sentencing schemes adequately narrow the death-
eligible class, see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
226. For a further discussion of the Cheely court's failure to take into account
the principles of individualization, see supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's individualization requirement, see supra
notes 5, 7, 48, 55-59, 75-77 and accompanying text.
227. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's failure to guard against
arbitrariness in death sentencing, see supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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simultaneous adherance to both requirements. 2 28 Instead, the Ninth Cir-
cuit only enlarged the degree of contradiction in this area of law.2 29 Thus,
after Cheely, the capital defendant remains inadequately protected from
arbitrary death sentencing.2 30
Lisa S. Paye
228. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's creation of contradic-
tory Eighth Amendment requirements, see supra notes 60-63, 78-87, 179-83, 192-
97 and accompanying text.
229. For a further discussion of how the Ninth Circuit enlarged the degree of
contradiction between the Court's two Eighth Amendment arbitrariness require-
ments, see supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
230. For a further discussion of the capital defendant's lack of adequate pro-
tections, see supra notes 177-83, 192-97 and accompanying text.
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